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world economy since the Great Depression of the 1930s. The distress
experienced by workers generally,1 and in the automobile industry in
particular, 2 has dramatized anew the widespread public hostility toward organized labor and some of its hard-fought gains.3 As in the
1930s, when a new legal framework for labor-management relations
was created out of turmoil and dislocation, 4 once again in this century, there are both direct protests and demands to change the law in
the form of amendments to the National Labor Relations Act. Once
again-this time as a direct result of the 2008 experience-the imperative is that regulation must trump the market. Now, as in the 1930s,
the labor market cannot be immune from this policy shift.
The National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"),

5

the principal

statute applicable to most of the private sector in the United
Of course, I take full responsibility for errors, omissions, or other deficiencies in this
Article.
1. STEVEN GREENHOUSE, THE BIG SQUEEZE: TOUGH TIMES FOR THE AMERICAN WORKER
184-98 (2008) (discussing the current overstressed work environment and its causes); Bob
Herbert, Race to the Bottom, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2008, at A21.
2.

BRUCE RAYNOR, Op-Ed., UAW Busting, Southern Style, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2008, at

A31.
3. Bernard Simon, High Wages Put Detroit Union Under Pressure,FIN. TIMES (London),
Dec. 15, 2008, at A2; John Reed, Bernard Simon &Julie Macintosh, Factory Mood Sours After
Senate Snub, FIN. TIMES (London), Dec. 13, 2008, at A2; John Reed & Daniel Schifer, World
CarmakersWatch Anxiously, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2008, at A2. David Leonhardt, $73 an Hour:
Adding It Up, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2008, at Al. I confess that I previously had a more positive
view of collective bargaining developments which are now under scrutiny. William B.
Gould IV, Op-Ed., Watch for a HistoricAuto Pact, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 1987, at A19.
4. WALTER GALENSON, THE CIO CHALLENGE TO THE AFL: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
LABOR MOVEMENT, 1935-1941, at 3-4 (1960); see also IRVING BERNSTEIN, TURBULENT YEARS:
A HISTORY OF T1-E AMERICAN WORKER, 1933-1941 (1985); LEO WOLMAN, EBB AND FLOW IN
TRADE UNIONISM (1936) (providing a more long-range historical view of the American Labor Movement).
5. Prior to 2009, the NLRA was amended in 1947 by the Taft-Hartley Act, Pub. L. No.
80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (2000)), and in 1959 by the
Landrum-Griffin Act, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519-46 (1959) (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 401-531 (1988)). But the public policy promoting freedom of association and collective
bargaining for workers contained in the preamble to the NLRA has never been qualified.
Even modest increases in the share of the unionized labor force push wages upward, because nonunion workplaces must keep up with unionized ones that collectively bargain for increases. By giving employees a bigger say in compensation
issues, unions also help to establish corporate norms, the absence of which has
contributed to unjustifiable disparities between executive pay and rank-and-file
pay.
Op-Ed., The LaborAgenda, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2008, at A22 [hereinafter The Labor Agenda].
It seems unlikely, however, that unions will be able to press the pay disparity issue at
the bargaining table since the NLRB and the Supreme Court may view this as a nonmandatory or permissive subject of bargaining. See, e.g., First Nat'l Maint. Corp. v. NLRB,
452 U.S. 666 (1981) (holding that a partial closing is a management prerogative and thus
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States, 6 contains a trinity of basic principles. The first is that a collective bargaining obligation exists where a majority of employees select
a labor organization to represent them. The second is that the majority will must be expressed within an appropriate unit or grouping of
employees who enjoy a so-called "community of interests" with one
another. 7 And the third is that this majority representative expressed
in an appropriate unit provides the union with the authority to bargain on behalf of those within the appropriate unit, be they union or
non-union employees, as an exclusive bargaining representative entitled to bind all within the unit.8
For nearly four decades, two developments have fueled an ongoing debate about labor law reform as it relates to the NLRA. The first
is the precipitous decline of the unions,9 a dramatic phenomenon
that is linked to growing income inequality' ° in the United States.
non-mandatory); Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. NLRB, 347 F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1965) (holding that
employers are required to disclose data pertaining to non-unit employees only when there
is a demonstrable relationship between bargaining unit and non-bargaining unit); William
B. Gould IV, The Supreme Court's Labor and Employment Docket in the 1980 Term: Justice Brennan's Term, 53 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 5-18 (1981) (criticizing the Court's holding in First
NationalMaintenance that an employer's partial closure of its business operations is not a
mandatory subject of bargaining within the meaning of the Act). Executive pay can be
viewed as a management prerogative and thus a non-mandatory subject of bargaining.
A byproduct of the litigation which has emerged in the wake of First NationalMaintenance is excessive litigation. See Q-1 Motor Exp., Inc., 323 N.L.R.B. 767, 767-69 (Gould,
Chairman, concurring) (pointing out that unions rarely have the information requisite to
challenge employer decisions); see also id. at 769-72.
6. The NLRA excludes railway workers and airline workers, who are instead covered
under the Railway Labor Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-257, 44 Stat. 577 (1926) (codified in
part, as amended, at 45 U.S.C. § 151 (2008)).
7. See, e.g., Am. Cyanamid Co., 131 N.L.R.B. 909, 910 (1961).
8. J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 342 (1944) (holding that individual contracts
will not be enforced to forestall collective bargaining). In the same year, the Court held
that a duty to represent all employees within the unit, fairly and without hostility in a nonarbitrary fashion, existed by virtue of the principle of exclusivity. See generally Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Ry., 323 U.S. 192 (1944) (holding that the Railway Labor Act implies a
duty of fair representation).
9. NLRB Administration of the Labor-Management Relations Act, Hearings Before
the Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Education and Labor, 87th Cong. (1961) [hereinafter
Pucinski Hearings]; see also WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, AGENDA FOR REFORM: THE FUTURE OF
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS AND THE LAw, 12-17 (1993) [hereinafter GOULD, AGENDA FOR
REFORM]; William B. Gould IV, Taft-Hartley Revisited: The Contrariety of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement and the Plight of the Unorganized, 13 LABOR L.J. 348, 351-52
(1962); SOLOMON BARKIN, THE DECLINE OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT: A REPORT TO THE
CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS (1961).
10. Daniel Gross, Income Inequality, Writ Larger, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2007, § 3, at 7;
David Cay Johnston, Income Gap Is Widening, Data Shows, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2007, at Cl;
Louis Uchitelle, AfterPausing, Income Gap is GrowingAgain, N.Y. TIMEs, June 23, 2002, § 3, at
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This has translated into the absence of an important democratic institution in the workplace and society, one which is so much more important in Europe-with the consequent impediments that this
phenomenon throws in the way of effective and mature labor management relationships and cooperative initiatives between both workers
and employers." Though the lengthy trend of decline, which has
been proceeding since 1955, was recently halted in a relatively miniscule way, 12 the latter appears to be a mere blip on the screen and the
general trend continues nearly unabated.
The role of labor law, as an instrument for the promotion of freedom of association amongst workers to ban together effectively to join
unions and promote the collective bargaining process, has declined as
well. However, many observers assume an incorrect non sequitur, i.e.,
that these two developments are connected with one another and that
if the law can be reformed, union decline can be halted. In myjudgment, this analysis is superficial, as there are numerous factors which
are responsible for the union decline phenomenon.
First and foremost among them is globalization and foreign competition, initially from Japan and Europe in the 1970s and more re11. Keeler Brass Auto. Group, 317 N.L.R.B. 1110, 1117-19 (1995) (Gould, Chairman,
concurring) (indicating that there might be some room for lawful operation of employee
participation committees, even when it is the employer that creates the committee); see also
WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, JAPAN'S RESHAPING OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW 17-43 (1984); GOULD,
AGENDA FOR REFORM, supra note 9, at 115-19. But see NLRB v. Ins. Agents' Int'l Union, 361
U.S. 477, 488-89 (1960) ("It must be realized that collective bargaining, under a system
where the Government does not attempt to control the results of negotiations, cannot be
equated with an academic collective search for truth-or even with what might be thought
to be the ideal of one. The parties-even granting the modification of views that may come
from a realization of economic interdependence-still proceed from contrary and to an
extent antagonistic viewpoints and concepts of self-interest. The system has not reached
the ideal of the philosophic notion that perfect understanding among people would lead
to perfect agreement among them on values.").
12. The most recent annual survey of union membership carried out by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics states:
In 2007, the number of workers belonging to a union rose by 311,000 to 15.7
million, the U.S. Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics reported today. Union members accounted for 12.1 percent of employed wage and salary
workers, essentially unchanged from 12.0 percent in 2006. In 1983, the first year
for which comparable union data are available, the union membership rate was
20.1 percent.
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, UNION MEMBERS IN 2007, at 1 (2008),
available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf. This is a far cry from the
halcyon days of 1955 when union density reached its peak of over 35% of the private, nonagricultural workforce and 16.4 million workers were members of labor organizations. See
LEO TROY & NEIL SHELFIN, UNION SOURCEBOOK: MEMBERSHIP, STRUCTURE FINANCE DIREG

TORY, at A-i app. A (1985).
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cently from countries such as Brazil, Korea, and Vietnam, the former
Eastern European bloc, and the Pacific Rim-especially China, whose
slumber has now been disrupted in the twenty-first century. This is
why the debate about free trade played such a major role in the 2008
13
presidential campaign, particularly in the Democratic primaries,
arising in the form of legislative debate about free trade agreements
involving countries such as Peru and Columbia and the impact and
renegotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement
("NAFTA") .14
A second factor is the composition of the work force, particularly
because of the advent of numerous undocumented workers who do
not enjoy the protection of the NLRA,15 notwithstanding the fact that
thus far they are regarded as employees within the meaning of the
law.' 6 Another related factor is the advent of the contingent tempo13. See DEMOCRATIC NAT'L COMM., THE 2008 DEMOCRATIC NAT'ONAL PLATFORM: RENEWING AMERICA'S PROMISE 26-27 (2008), available at http://www.democrats.org/a/party/

platform.html [hereinafter DNC 2008 PLATFORM]; see also Elisabeth Malkin, Revisiting
NAFTA in Hopes to Cure Manufacturing,N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2008, at C7; Michael Luo, Despite NAFfA Attacks, Clinton and Obama Haven't Been Free Trade Foes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28,
2008, at A23.
14. See, e.g., 154 CONG. REC. S785-01 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 2008); 154 CONG. REc. H217701 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 2008).
15. See, e.g.,
Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 149 (2002);
A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil Buyers Group, Inc., 320 N.L.R.B. 408, 408 (1995), enforced, 134 F.3d 50
(2d Cir. 1997); WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, LABORED RELATIONS: LAW, POLITICS AND THE NLRB

133-34 (2000) [hereinafter GOULD, LABORED RELATIONS].
16. See Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 891-92 (1984). Attempted reversals of
this decision have failed. See Agri Processor Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 514 F.3d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir.
2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 594 (2008). The state of things in the real world is accurately
described in a lengthy representation dispute that began during my Chairmanship and
ultimately ended with the twice-defeated union prevailing:
The union won by 2,041 votes to 1,879 after two years of turmoil at the plant. As a
result of a federal crackdown on illegal immigrants, more than 1,500 Hispanic
workers have left the plant. Its work force is now 60 percent black, up from
around 20 percent two years ago.
Steven Greenhouse, After 15 Years, North CarolinaPlant Unionizes, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2008,
at A10; cf Smithfield Foods, Inc., 347 N.L.R.B. No. 109, at 8 (2006), enforced sub nom,
United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 204 v. NLRB, 506 F.3d 1078, 1087 (D.C.
Cir. 2007) (holding that the proper remedy for employer unfair labor practices under
certain circumstances is a re-run election as opposed to a Gissel bargaining order).
Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 891-92, and A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil Buyers Group, 320 N.L.R.B. at 408,
rest upon the proposition that a failure to protect the undocumented worker undermines
standards for all workers. "If you uphold workers rights, even for those here illegally, you
uphold them for all working Americans. If you ignore and undercut the rights of illegal
immigrants, you encourage the exploitation that erodes working conditions and job security everywhere. In a time of economic darkness, the stability and dignity of the work force
are especially vital." Editorial, Getting Immigration Right, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2008, at A38.
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rary workers frequently referred by agencies such as Manpower, 17 the
growth of independent contractors who are not viewed as part of the
employment relationship, 18 as well as part-time1 9 and casual employees who, along with their spouses or partners, work more than one job
to maintain an acceptable standard of living.
Third, the expanding union-nonunion wage differential 20 creates
a greater incentive for nonunion employers to resist unionization and
places the organized sector of the economy, like the automobile industry which has negotiated health care and pension benefits, 2 t at a
competitive disadvantage. The gamble pursued by the United Auto
Workers ("UAW") and other major industrial unions in the late 1940s
and early 1950s, i.e., that organized employers would join with them
to create a world in which unionized employers were not at a disad22
vantage, never materialized.
Fourth, the fact that the Unites States and other industrialized
countries are shifting from manufacturing to service industries that
are more labor intensive provides another incentive for employers to
resist unions. In this sector, the employer is more likely to pursue
unappealing options when confronted with union-negotiated collec17. See generally M.B. Sturgis, Inc., 331 N.L.R.B. 1298 (2000) (consolidating several
cases involving the representational rights of a segment of the contingent work force), rev'd
Oakwood Care Ctr., 343 N.L.R.B. 659 (2004).
18. See Roadway Package Sys. Inc., 326 N.L.R.B. 842 (1998); Dial-A-Mattress Operating
Corp., 326 N.L.R.B. 884, 894-97 (1998) (Gould, Chairman, dissenting); cf Elite Limousine
Plus, Inc., 324 N.L.R.B. 992 (1997) (finding that limousine drivers are employees of a
limousine service franchise).
19. See, e.g., M.B. Sturgis, 331 N.L.R.B. at 1312; Tree of Life, Inc., 336 N.L.R.B. 872,
875 (2001). Moreover, Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 1997), held that
temporary workers are entitled to the same benefits as their permanent counterparts. Id. at
1200.
20. See ROBERT FLANAGAN, LABOR RELATIONS AND THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION (1987);
JOHN SCHMIT[, CTR. FOR ECONOMIC AND POLICY RESEARCH, UNIONS AND UPWARD MOBILITY

FOR WOMEN WORKERS

1 (2008), available at http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/unionsand upwardmobility-for womenworkers_2008 12.pdf; Eduardo Porter,
Unions Pay Dearly for Success, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2006, at BU4; William B. Gould IV, Discussion, The National Labor Relations Act After Seventy Years, LAB. & EMP. RELATIONS, Jan. 6-8,

2006, at 150-56.
21. Danny Hakim, G.M. Board Gives Union A Deadline, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2005, at Cl.
22. Malcolm Gladwell, The Risk Pool: What's Behind Ireland's Economic Miracle-and
G.M. 'sFinancialCrisis?, NEW YORKER, Aug. 28, 2006, at 30. The courts and the NLRB facilitated collective bargaining about fringe benefits in the immediate post-war era. See generally
Inland Steelv. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 960 (1949) (holding
that pension and retirement plans constitute compulsory collective bargaining subject matter). The failure to transform healthcare into universal legislation is responsible for the
emergence of a non-union "transplant" auto sector in the United States. For a critical view
of the UAW and the so-called Big 3, see Op-Ed., America's Other Auto Industry, WALL ST.J.,
Dec. 1, 2008, at A22.
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tive bargaining agreements which provide for improved employment
and living standards: (1) to either reduce profit margins; or (2) to
attempt to pass the costs on to the public-in contrast to manufacturing where technological innovations have traditionally provided an avenue through which labor costs can be absorbed.
In a number of respects, however, the law has played a role in
union decline. 2 3 In the first place, employers, able to use the permanent replacement weapon in response to lawful strikes since 1938,24
have begun to use this tactic increasingly since the 1980s-perhaps in
response to President Reagan's example when he fired the unlawfully
striking air controllers. 25 Employers have been able to disappear and
relieve themselves of their union and contractual obligations through
creating alter egos 26 and have escaped union relationships through
the successorship doctrine devised by the United States Supreme
Court.2 7 Unions have been weakened by the Court's holding that

union members have the right to resign from membership and obligations at any point, including the time of the use of the strike weapon
itself, and thus escape contractual obligations entered into, notwith23. See JAMES ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAw 179-80
(1983); Jeffrey M. Hirsch and Barry T. Hirsch, The Rise and Fall of Private Sector Unionism:
What Next for the NLRA?, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1133, 1138 (2007); Paul Weiler, Striking a
New Balance: Freedom of Contract and the Prospectsfor Union Representation, 98 HARV. L. REv.
351, 352 (1984); Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization
Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1769, 1770 (1983).

24. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345-46 (1938) (permitting an
employer's use of permanent replacements in economic strikes); cf Change.gov, The
Obama-Biden Labor Agenda, http://www.change.gov/agenda/economyagenda (last visited Jan. 1, 2009) ("Protect striking workers: Obama and Biden support the right of workers to bargain collectively and strike if necessary. They will work to ban the permanent
replacement of striking workers, so workers can stand up for themselves without worrying
about losing their livelihoods."). See also generallyJoseph P. Norelli, Permanent Replacements:
Timefor a New Look?, 24 LAB. LAw. 97 (2008) (advocating for the elimination of the required presumption that an employee's motives are legitimate when using permanent,
rather than temporary, employees).
25. WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, A PRIMER ON AMERICAN LABOR LAw 194 (4th ed. 2004)
[hereinafter GOULD, PRIMER]; Richard Witkin, U.S. Says Goal Now is to Reconstruct Air Control
Force, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1981, at Al; Richard Witkin, U.S. Begins Sending Dismissals to Controllers and Jails Five; Rights Up "Slightly" in 3rd Day, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1981, at Al.
26.

See generally Crawford Door Sales Co., 226 N.L.R.B. 1144 (1976); cf PATRICK HAR-

DIN, I DEVELOPING LABOR LAw 816-29 (3d ed. 1992).

27. See, e.g.,John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 555 (1964); Fall River
Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 40-47 (1987); NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security
Servs., 406 U.S. 272, 281 (1972). But see Canteen Co., 317 N.L.R.B. 1052, 1054-55 (1995)
(Gould, Chairman, concurring), enforced, 103 F.3d 1355 (7th Cir. 1997); see also GOULD,
PRIMER, supra note 25, at 159-60.
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standing union constitutional provisions which impose limitations on
this right.

28

The problems which have attracted the most attention from labor
law reformers are an inability to fashion punitive damages of the kind
available in antitrust law, 29 and the ineffectiveness of remedies, i.e.,
back pay minus interim earnings or those which could have been obtained with reasonable diligence. 30 Comparable attention has been
given to efforts to impose any kind of contractual protection, such as
through union security agreements or check-off clauses under which
employers are obliged to remit union dues from employee paychecks
to the union. 3 ' This approach would protect a collective bargaining
relationship in its embryonic form shortly after a union has survived a
certification proceeding and established majority support at the ballot
3 2

box.

Fueling the remedy crisis is the administrative quagmire that has
at various times either afflicted the National Labor Relations Board
("NLRB"), or that the NLRB itself has inflicted upon the public, in
both unfair labor practice and representation proceedings. In part,
this problem is attributable to loopholes which employers can exploit
for delay, providing for a period of time of months or years just at the
NLRB alone, 33 during which workers will lose interest in unions and
the collective bargaining process-and the remedy will affect only the
28.

See William B. Gould IV, Solidarity Forever or Hardly Ever: Union Discipline, Taft-Hart-

ley, and the Right of Union Members to Resign, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 74, 83-91 (1980); GOULD,

PRIMER, supra note 25, at 336-38. See also generally Pattern Makers v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95
(1985) (holding that a union is in violation of the NLRA if it fines members for resigning
during a strike action even if that resignation is invalid based upon union rules).
29. See Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 11-12 (1940) (holding that the
NLRB is precluded from imposing punitive damages).
30. See Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 198 (1941) (holding that the remedies of the Act provide compensation that requires mitigation of damages and the deduction of interim earnings from back pay).
31. H. K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 103 (1970).
32.

GOULD, AGENDA FOR REFORM, supra note 9, at 222-30.

33. See, e.g., Ex-Cell-O Corp., 185 N.L.R.B. 107, 108 (1970) (holding that the statute
does not authorize an award of lost compensation attributable to an employer's resort to
administrative avenues that delay the NLRB process), modified sub nom., Int'l Union v.
NLRB, 449 F.2d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1971), modified sub nom., Ex-Cell-O Corp. v. NLRB, 449
F.2d 1058 (D.C. Cir. 1971); cf Unbelievable, Inc. v. NLRB, 118 F.3d 795 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
But see Int'l Union of Elec. v. NLRB, 426 F.2d 1243 (D.C. Cir. 1970); GOULD, AGENDA FOR
REFORM, supra note 9, at 221. Moreover, union lethargy and a failure to commit robust
organizational efforts has both induced decline and split the labor movement into two
competing entities. See Ruth Milkman, Op-Ed., A More Perfect Union, N.Y. TIMES, June 30,
2005, at A25; Ruth Milkman, Divided We Stand, 15 NEW La. FORUM 38 (2005). Nonetheless,
the possibility that the labor movement will be re-energized as the result of labor law reform cannot be gainsaid. See William B. Gould IV, Prospects for Labor Law Reform After
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individual, as opposed to the collective interests of union representation. 34 Indeed, the NLRB, which had a culture of excellence since its
inception in the New Deal period in 1935, has recently obtained one
of the worst reputations for its long delays and consequent failure to
35
discharge its statutory mission.
The last two subjects, i.e., delay in the administrative process and
the ineffectiveness of remedies, has drawn much attention from labor
law reformers; though the striker replacement issue was the focus of
congressional interest, albeit aborted by the Senate filibuster in the
1990s. 3 6 In 1977, the House of Representatives passed the Labor Reform Bill which touched upon these issues in legislation supported by
PresidentJimmy Carter. But in the following year, it met the graveyard
37
of labor law reform in the filibuster in the United States Senate.
Most recently the issue has emerged anew in the form of the so-called
Employee Free Choice Act, which has been a focal point of controversy since the House of Representatives passed it in March 2007, becoming part of the 2008 Democratic Party platform and presidential
38
campaign.
In this Article, I review the Employee Free Choice Act, and, while
noting that it is generally superior to the status quo contained in a
broken existing system, I contend that the Act is not the best answer
to the problem of labor law reform. It is the substitution of one imperfect approach with another one. Thus, I propose expedited elections
the 2008 Election-Law Perspective, Remarks at the Labor and Employment Relations Association 61st Annual Meeting 2 (Jan. 4, 2009) (paper on file with author).
34. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., Inc., 395 U.S. 575, 610 (1969).
35. See generally NLRB v. Ancor Concepts, 166 F.3d 55 (2d Cir. 1999); GOULD, LABORED RELATIONS, supra note 15, at 287-305; GOULD, PRIMER, supra note 25, at 134-38.
36. CATHERINE S. MAINGOLD, For 2d Time, Senators Block Bill to Bar Replacement of Strikers,
N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1994, at D23.
37. See 124 CONG. REc. 6586-87, 11,808, 15,635-41, 16,165-87, 18,393-400 (1978)
(debating the Labor Reform Act and subsequent failures to pass a cloture motion to close
the debate); see also Philip Shabecoff, Labor-Law Revisions Put Aside in Senate, N.Y. TIMES,
June 23, 1978, at Al; William B. Gould IV, Prospectsfor Labor-Law Reform, NATION, Apr. 16,
1977, at 466.
38. DNC 2008 PLATFORM, supra note 13, at 14; Carl Hulse, Advocacy Groups, in Big Ad
Campaigns, Step Up Intensity of Senate Races, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2008, at A19. It is possible
that the filibuster could be used-as it has been in the past-to deny a vote on the EFCA.
See Robbie Brown & Carl Hulse, Republican Wins Runoff for Senator in Georgia, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 3, 2008, at A17. ("Saxby Chambliss, a first-term Republican senator, was re-elected by
Georgia voters on Tuesday in a substantial victory, ending Democratic hopes for a 60-vote
majority in the Senate that would make it difficult for Republicans to filibuster the Obama
administration's legislative agenda."). However, it is possible that some Democrats would
not have voted to break the filibuster and some Republicans would have switched to the
Democratic side.
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similar to what some of the Canadian provinces have adopted as a
basis for recognition, instead of authorization cards, that, in my view,
contain numerous deficiencies. I note that the Canadian approach,
i.e., to postpone the resolution of disputed issues, such as the eligibility of individuals to vote in the election until subsequent to the vote
itself, is not unknown to the American system given the Clinton

Board's use of such approaches during my Chairmanship in the
1990s.
I advocate so-called conditional recognition, which would allow
employees to choose simultaneously a union and a proposed contract,
because this gives employees real information about their prospective
employment conditions while also giving employers a sense of the cost
of the bargain, particularly in critical work rules and job classifications
arenas, and thus reduces campaign propaganda and acrimony emanating from both sides during the campaign itself. I express the view
that this revision can be accomplished either by NLRB reversal of precedent or as part of new legislation.
I also note that most certifications and recognition accorded unions as the exclusive bargaining representative do not result in the
negotiation of collective bargaining agreement, the sine qua non for
continued representation. I concur with the Employee Free Choice
Act's acceptance of arbitration as a final measure to resolve differences between employees and employers over new contracts, in part,
because of the fact that no agreement is mandated under existing law
and is without the difficulties involved with duty to bargain litigation
in a first contract context. Finally, I note that the overriding problem
in labor law is delay-a phenomenon that affects both election machinery and the difficulty in bargaining a first contract subsequent to
certification or recognition of the union. A major part of the delay
problem is found in an examination of the NLRB itself and its
politicized nature, and I propose that the appointment process be reformed in order to diminish this feature and make the NLRB more
truly quasi-judicial. In this connection, I reiterate my earlier proposals
to expedite the administrative process and to facilitate more effective
law enforcement.
I note that there are a number of answers to the problem of delay
beyond those stated above, including rulemaking, and suggest ways in
which there can be an adherence to time limits.
Finally, I propose that procedures privately adopted in at least
one corporation are superior, in some respects, to voluntarily negoti-
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ated card check or recognition systems and propose that such procedures be included in amendments of the NLRA itself.
In Parts I, II, III, and IV, I develop my proposals for expedited
elections, rather than authorization cards, as a basis for recognition.
In Part V, I put forward my proposals for a form of conditional recognition in which employees choose both the union and a collective bargaining agreement. In Part VI, I set forth my proposals about post
recognition bargaining and the arbitration process to address first
contract negotiations. And in Part VII, I assess the general problem of
delay in the statutory process and provide a number of proposals to
remedy this.
I.

The Way Forward

Canada, governed for the most part by provincial labor law in
contrast to the United States,3 9 has a good deal of experience with
both card checks or authorization cards as a basis for recognition and
election machinery similar to that of the National Labor Relations
Act. The Canadian experience seems to indicate that unions are more
successful with authorization cards than election machinery, undoubtedly contributing to the labor movement's demand for card check reform in both countries. 40 In fact, recent legislative debate in
Saskatchewan has highlighted the fact that there is no obvious correlation between the extent of unionization and provincial labor law relating to card check or secret ballot. 4 1 Though there have been scholarly
39. GOULD, AGENDA FOR REFORM, supra note 9, at 205-34. The doctrine of preemption
has made American labor law national. See generally San Diego Building Trades Council v.
Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959) (holding that the States' jurisdiction over subject matter
normally relegated to the NLRB is displaced, even when the NLRB has declined to assert
jurisdiction over the dispute in question); Machinists Lodge 76 v. Wis. Employment Relations Comm., 427 U.S. 132 (1976) (noting that the States must yield to federal jurisdiction
if the activities the State desires to regulate are encompassed in the NLRA).
40. See Michele Campolieti et al., Labor Law Reform and the Role of Delay in Union Organizing: EmpiricalEvidencefrom Canada,61 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 32, 34-35 (2007); Sara
S1inn, The Effect of Compulsory Certification Votes on Certification Applications in Ontario: An
EmpiricalAnalysis, 10 CANADIAN LAB. & Emp. L.J. 399 (2006); Sara Slinn, An Analysis of the
Effects on Parties' UnionizationDecisions of the Choice of Union RepresentationProcedure:The Strategic Dynamic CertificationModel, 43 OSCOODE HALL LJ. 407, 441 (2005); Chris Riddell, Union
CertificationSuccess Under Voting Versus Card-Check Procedures:Evidence from British Columbia,
1978-1998, 57 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 493, 494 (2004); Susan Johnson, Card Check or
Mandatory Representation Vote? How the Type of Union Recognition ProcedureAffects Union Certification Success, 112 EcoN.J. 344, 344 (2002); Chris Riddell, Union Suppression and Certification
Success, 34 C,,, J. EcoN. 396 (2001); Murphy, Comment, A Comparison of the Selection of
BargainingRepresentatives in the United States and Canada: Linden Lumber, Gissel, and the
Right to Challenge Majority Status, 10 CoMP. LAB. L.J. 65, 81-83 (1989).
41. The testimony of Minister Rob Norris of Saskatchewan is as follows:
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commentaries on the extent to which these different legislative approaches affect union organizing and success in obtaining recognition, the reality is that any number of factors alluded to above could
be responsible for them.
For a number of years, there has been an ongoing debate between unions and employers about card check as opposed to secret
ballot box elections, 42 with the unions favoring the former and the
employers the latter. Unions have argued that with a secret ballot box
election, employees are exposed to more employer self-help and onesided propaganda and that statements and intimidation may induce
employees to vote against a union. 43 But employers contend that if
That is, secret ballots are used in both British Columbia and Alberta. What we see
in British Columbia and Alberta are what I would refer to .... There's a pretty
significant divergence in rates of unionization or union coverage as Stats Canada
has deemed this. So the Alberta rate is just 24 per cent, British Columbia 32 per
cent, 32 and a bit. So what we see is with a secret ballot in place, we have diverging
numbers regarding unionization.
What I then said is we've isolated that variable, that is the variable that is a secret
ballot provision resides within both jurisdictions. Therefore I would suggest that it
would be through other variables or factors that we would have to begin to explain rates of unionization. That is if both Alberta and [British Columbia] have
secret ballot provisions, but they still have diverging rates of unionization or
union coverage, then the answer, at least as far beginning an inquiry is to turn
and say how would someone go about explaining that as a sociological phenomenon or as a political phenomenon.
The second example that I offered was, if I have this correct ... we've got Newfoundland and Saskatchewan. The union coverage in Newfoundland is 37.7 [percent]. In Saskatchewan it's 34.8 [percent]. So what we see is a jurisdiction with a
secret ballot provision that actually has a higher rate of union coverage than Saskatchewan does without that provision. So again I simply turn and say, as part of
any analysis on a go-forward basis, some additional variables or factors would have
to come into focus .... We would then turn and ask another question: are there
some potential alternative explanations about what's going on here?
Hearings on the Trade Union Amendment Act of 2007, Standing Committee on Human Services,
Legislative Assembly of Saskatchewan, 26th Leg. (May 6, 2008), at 369-70 (testimony of
Hon. Rob Norris, Minister of Saskatchewan), available at http://www.legassembly.sk.ca/
Committees/HumanServices/Verbatim/080506HumanServices.pdf.
42. See San Diego Gas &Elec., 325 N.L.R.B. 1143, 1146-47 (1998) (Gould, Chairman,
concurring) (arguing that where the NLRB held that postal ballots were appropriate, the
employer control of the election apparatus at its own facility formed part of the holding).
The National Mediation Board, which has jurisdiction over railway and airline workers, has
utilized telephone electronic voting. See In reTelephone Electronic Voting, 29 N.M.B. No.
90, 2002 WL 31654919, at *1 (Sept. 25, 2002). The process is described in Telephone Electronic Voting, 30 N.M.B. 481, 487-93 (2003).
43. Former NLRB Member Peter Hurtgen has argued that the win-loss record for
unions disproves this point. The Employee Free Choice Act, Hearings Before the S. Comm. of
Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, I10th Cong. 8-10 (2007) (Statement of Peter J.
Hurtgen, Senior Partner, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, LLP. The 50.8% success rate enjoyed
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card check is enacted into law, employees get a one-sided view from
the union's perspective because the employer may not know about the
campaign until the union has either achieved majority status through
cards or is on the brink of accomplishing this. Moreover, employers
say that employees will be misled, pressured, or coerced into signing
authorization cards-again perhaps swayed by a one-sided view of the
facts.
Yet, given the fact that the NLRB's performance for the past decade has been one of a downward spiral of delay and failure to use the
one statutory tool at the NLRB's disposal, i.e., to obtain injunctions so
as to diminish the delay problem, it is fair to say that the Employee
44
Free Choice Act's preference for card check, or authorization cards
as the basis for recognition, would be superior to the status quo contained in the existing system. 45 This is because the statute, as presently
structured, promotes what has become a cottage industry for emby unions seeking certification is higher than had been the case in 1995 (50.9%), 1985
(48%), and 1975 (50.4%). Id. at 6-8. What Hurtgen fails to note is that the win-loss ratio
has become increasingly unimportant as the number of elections has precipitously declined, the unions taking the easy winners to the NLRB. A more relevant comparison is
contained in the First Group experience, where unions have won more than 92.4% of
NLRB elections, albeit without the presence of anti-union speech of the kind present in
most NLRB elections. Telephone Interview with Mary Schottmiller, Executive Vice President, First Group America (Nov. 26, 2008). Between October 2007 and November 2008,
unions won 121 of 131 elections conducted at First Group. Id.
44. The text reads:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, whenever a petition shall
have been filed by an employee or group of employees or any individual or labor
organization acting [on] their behalf alleging that a majority of employees in a
unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining wish to be represented
by an individual or labor organization for such purposes, the Board shall investigate the petition. If the Board finds that a majority of the employees in a unit
appropriate for bargaining has signed valid authorizations designating the individual or labor organization specified in the petition as their bargaining representative and that no other individual or labor organization is currently certified or
recognized as the exclusive representative of any of the employees in the unit, the
Board shall not direct an election but shall certify the individual or labor organization as the representative described in subsection (a).
Employee Free Choice Act of 2007, H.R. 800, 110th Cong. § 2(a) (6) (2007).
Some proponents of the EFCA argue that a ballot can still be used. See, e.g., Aaron T.
Knapp, Restoring Common Sense to Labor Law, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 19, 2008, at B9 ("The act
does not affect the option to hold a secret ballot NLRB election, except to make it the
workers' option not the employer's."). But since card checks are more favorable to unions,
there will be no elections where unions or employees file a petition for representation. Cf
George Raine, Labor Working for Employee Free Choice Act, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 16, 2008, at Cl.
45. See William B. Gould R1, How Obama Could Fix Labor Law: A Labor Day Gift to Workers with Bipartisan Trimmings, SLATE, Aug. 29, 2008, http://www.slate.com/id/2198736/; cf
William B. Gould IV, Op-Ed., Why Labor Law is Not Working, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 21, 2006, at
B7.
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ployer propaganda which, even if unlawful because of its coercive nature, cannot be effectively remedied 4 6 and does not allow the union to
present its side of the outstanding issues because non-employee organizers are excluded from the workplace. 4 7 Moreover, unions contend that the Act's reliance upon card check mirrors what has
transpired on the ground and that more workers organize through
48
this procedure than through NLRB elections.
46. The demarcation line between permissible and coercive speech is a difficult one
to draw. See ARCHIBALD Cox, LAW AND THE NATIONAL LABOR POLICY 42-44 (1960). The
most important cases are collected in Judge Tatel's opinion in United Food & Commercial
Workers Union Local 204 v. National Labor Relations Board, 506 F.3d 1078 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
47. Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 532 (1992). Prior to the Taft-Hartley
amendments, captive audience speech was unlawful. See NLRB v. Clark Bros. Co., 163 F.2d
373, 376 (2d Cir. 1947). Contra NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 157 F.2d 486 (8th Cir.
1946). The enactment of Taft-Hartley produced a reluctant Board shift. See Babcock &
Wilcox Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 577, 578 (1948). However, where an imbalance in avenues of communication was present, the rule was revived so as to provide an opportunity for the union
to reply. See Bonwit Teller, 96 N.L.R.B. 608, 611-12 (1951), rev'd on other grounds, 197 F.2d
640 (2d Cir. 1952). The rule was abandoned by the Eisenhower Board in Livingston Shirt
Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 400, 409 (1953), and revived by the Kennedy Board in May Dep't Stores,
136 N.L.R.B. 797, 814 (1962), enforcement denied by 316 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1962). Now moribund, the rationale of Livingston Shirt was left untouched by the Clinton Board. See Montgomery Ward & Co., 339 F.2d 889; see also Beverly Enterprises-Haw.,Inc., 326 N.L.R.B. 335, 361
(1998) (Gould, Chairman, dissenting); cf NLRB v. United Steelworkers of Am., 357 U.S.
357 (1957); William B. Gould IV, Union OrganizationalRights and the Concept of Quasi-Public
Property, 49 MINN. L. REV. 505 (1965); William B. Gould IV, The Question of Union Activity on
Company Property, 18 VAND. L. REv. 73 (1964).
Union access cases frequently raise state property law issues. See, e.g., Farm Fresh, Inc.,
326 N.L.R.B. 997, 1003-04 (1998) (Gould, Chairman, concurring), rev'd sub nom., United
Food & Commercial Workers Int'l Union Local 400 v. NLRB, 222 F.3d 1030, 1035 (D.C.
Cir. 2000). A modern departure from Lechmere and its captive audience progeny is Fashion
Valley Mall, L.L.C. v. NLRB, 172 P.3d 742, 743 (Cal. 2007), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 94 (2008)
(holding that under the free speech provision of the California Constitution, it is unlawful
for a mall to enforce a rule prohibiting persons from urging customers to boycott a store in
the mall by a union). Under the line of authority established in Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v.
Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980), employer due process claims have been rejected. Id. at 82-83.
48. AFL-CIO Secretary Treasurer Richard Trumka has said that, in 2002, only 20% of
new union members were organized through NLRB-conducted elections. See Michelle Ambler, LaborNeeds to Find New Approaches in Order to Stem Decline, Academics Agree, 81 DALY LAB.
REP. C- (BNA), Apr. 28, 2003. In 2008, the AFL-CIO made a more modest claim: "[M]any
more workers have used this method than those who have organized through the National
Labor Relations Board election process during the same period." Am. RIGHTS AT WORK,
HALF A MILLION AND COUNTING (2008) available at http://www.americanrightsatwork.org/
dmdocuments/ARAWReports/half-a millionandcounting.pdf. For a general discussion
of card check development, see Adrienne Eaton &Jill Kriesky, Union OrganizingUnder Neutrality and Card Check Agreements, 55 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 42, 43-44 (2001); Roger Hartley, Non-Legislative Labor Law Reform and Pre-Recognition Labor Neutrality Agreements: The
Newest Civil Rights Movement, 22 BERKELEYJ. EMPL. & LAB. L. 369, 383 (2001); George Davies, Neutrality Agreements: Basic Principlesof Enforcement and Available Remedies, 16 LAB. LAW.
215, 215 (2000).
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But is the Employee Free Choice Act the best answer to the problem of labor law reform?49 And what about the rest of the provisions
in the Act, particularly those that provide for arbitration of interest
disputes about the terms of a new collective bargaining agreement 5°
so as to preserve an embryonic relationship in first contract negotiations? On the latter point the Act, as presently written, does not seem
to take into account the problems (discussed below) which have confronted the Canadians in their attempt to provide for a coexistence
between collective bargaining and arbitration which is both peaceful
and fruitful. 51 Moreover, the juxtaposition of card check for recognition and first contract arbitration fails to take account of the fact that
the well-founded challenges to the former-the majority of Canadian
provinces have now switched to elections-will be harmful to arbitration efficacy. A failure to acknowledge the legitimacy of union representation status subsequent to certification can both poison the
bargaining process and thus overload the volume of cases proceeding
to arbitrations. 52 It is especially important that policymakers get both
49. For a thorough discussion of free choice in the context of labor law reform, see
Arlen Specter & Eric Nguyen, Representation Without Intimidation: Securing Workers' Right to
Choose Under the NationalLabor RelationsAct, 45 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 311 (2008); see also Steven
Greenhouse, Unions Look for New Life In the World of Obama, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2008, at B6;
Steven Greenhouse, After Pushfor Obama, Unions Seek New Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2008, at
A33; Kris Maher, Labor Wants Obama to Take on Big Fight, WALL ST. J., Nov. 6, 2008, at A5.
50. The text reads:
If after the expiration of the 30-day period beginning on the date on which the
request for mediation is made under paragraph (2), or such additional period as
the parties may agree upon, the Service is not able to bring the parties to agreement by conciliation, the Service shall refer the dispute to an arbitration board
established in accordance with such regulations as may be prescribed by the Service. The arbitration panel shall render a decision setting the dispute and such
decision shall be binding upon the parties for a period of 2 years, unless amended
during such period by written consent of the parties.
Employee Free Choice Act of 2007, H.R. 800, 110th Cong. § 3(h) (3) (2007).
51. For a comprehensive account of the experiences of Ontario, Manitoba, and Quebec, see Yarrow Lodge Ltd., B.C.LR.B. No. B444/93 (1993). For a general discussion of
these matters, see PAUL 'VEILER, RECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES: NEw DIRECTIONS IN CANADIAN
LABOUR LAw 104-06 (1980);Jean Sexton, First ContractArbitration: A CanadianInvention, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1987 SPRING MEETING OF THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS RESEARCH AssociATION 508 (Barbara D. Dennis ed., 1987); Constance Backhouse, The Fleck Strike: A Case
Study in the Need for First Contract Arbitration, (1980), 18 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 495; ALASTAR
PETER MACDONALD, INDUS. RELATIONS CTR., FIRST CONTRACT ARBITRATION IN CANADA 55
(1988); Grant Mitchell, Private Sector Statutory Interest Arbitration: The Manitoba Experience in
the Canadian Context-Imposed First Contracts and Final Offer Selection, 5
CAN. J. ADMIN. L. PRAc. 287 (1992).
52. I owe this insight to Mr. Gall of Heenan Blaikie, Vancouver, and Mr. Dinsdale of
Heenan Blaikie, Toronto, as well as Professor McCartin of Georgetown University.
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parts of the law right. Failure in recognition will harm subsequent bargaining and arbitration.
Finally, there is the abiding matter of remedies, which the new
Act addresses through triple damage relief for workers who are dismissed unlawfully in union organizing campaigns. The Act provides a
fine of up to $20,000 for each violation, and a provision mandating
the NLRB to seek injunctive relief in federal district court against employer unfair labor practices in the same way that the NLRB is mandated to obtain injunctive relief in connection with a wide variety of
union unfair labor practices, particularly unlawful secondary boycotts
and organizational picketing. 5 3 Unlawful coercion and intimidation
by employers cannot be remedied now because: (1) the back pay
award which constitutes the outer limits of monetary relief simply constitutes a "license fee" for employer misconduct; 54 and (2) delay in the
process simply exacerbates the difficulties employees experience in acquiring adequate compensation. It is far less costly for employers to
use delay tactics, rather than negotiate enhanced wages and fringe
benefits in a collective bargaining agreement, when employees have
frequently scattered to the winds, thus making it unlikely that the collective bargaining process can be resurrected.
I.

Union Recognition-Card Checks and Elections

When the National Labor Relations Act was first passed in 1935,
the NLRB certified unions as exclusive representatives on the basis of
either a card check or a secret ballot box election. But in 1939, the
agency held in Cudahy Packing Co., 55 albeit in the context of competing claims by two unions, that an election was the "more satisfactory"
process if "the doubt in disagreement of the parties regarding the
wishes of employees" was to be eliminated. 56 Over Member Smith's
dissent, the NLRB noted that it had certified representatives without
an election but stated that its experience manifested that the Act's
53. Employee Free Choice Act of 2007, H.R. 800, 110th Cong. § 4 (2007) ("In determining the amount of any penalty under this section, the Board shall consider the gravity
of the unfair labor practice and the impact of the unfair labor practice on the charging
party, on other persons seeking to exercise rights guaranteed by this Act, or the public
interest."). Contempt sanctions are punishable "by a fine of not more than $5,000 or by
imprisonment for not more than one year, or both." Id. § 12(b). This may ease weaknesses
in Board contempt disputes. See Florian Bartosic & Ian Lanoff, Escalatingthe StruggleAgainst
Taft-Hartley Contemnors, 39 U. CHI. L. REv. 255 (1971).
54. Pucinski Hearings,supra note 9, at 22; see also Philip Ross, The Role of Government in
Union Growth, 350 ANNAtLS Am. AcAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 74, 75 (1963).
55. 13 N.L.R.B. 526 (1939).
56. Id. at 531.
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policies would "best be effectuated if the question of representation
which has arisen is resolved in an election by secret ballot. '57 A few
months later, the NLRB marched forward and applied its preference
to a case where the company simply contested the union's claims
based upon cards and said that "any negotiations entered into pursuant to a determination of representatives by the Board will be more
satisfactory if all disagreement between the parties regarding the
' 58
wishes of the employees has been, as far as possible, eliminated.
This practice seems to have been adopted in response to the threat of
congressional investigations that arose out of criticism of a number of
NLRB procedures. 59 As former NLRB Chairman Harry A. Millis and

Emily Clark Brown said in their classic work:
57. Id. at 531-32. Member Smith dissented:
The process of certification has been wisely used by the Board to facilitate prompt
collective bargaining in cases where the fact of majority adherence to a particular
labor organization is made amply clear at a hearing at which all sides are free to
advance their claims. I see no warrant for concluding, as does the majority opinion in this case, that "the doubt and disagreement of the parties regarding the
wishes of the employees" has not been satisfactorily disposed of by the evidence in
the record.
Id. at 533.
58. Armour & Co., 13 N.L.R.B. 567, 572 (1939). Again, Member Smith dissented, concluding that "[t]he device of certification without an election seems to me particularly
appropriate when there is, as in this case, only one labor organization seeking to be designated as the representative of the employees." Id. at 575.
59. JAMES A. GROSS, THE RESHAPING OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD: NATIONAL LABOR POLICY IN TRANSITION 1937-1947, at 104-06 (1981). States Prof. Gross regarding Cudahy Packing.
[T]he Board . . . made what Louis Stark [the New York Times labor reporter]
called a radical departure from its previous practice of certifying bargaining representatives on the basis of membership cards without a representation election, a
practice that had been severely criticized during the Senate and House Committee hearings. The NLRB had certified Harry Bridges' Longshoremen's Union in
the Shipowners' Association of the Pacific Coast case, for example, on the basis of a
membership card check. Critics of this approach maintained that employees
signed these cards out of fraud and coercion or simply to get rid of union solicitors. In the Cudahy case, which was heard in March, 1939, the Board designated a
bargaining unit which included 157 employees but refused to certify the United
Packinghouse Workers Organizing Committee (CIO) as the bargaining representative of these employees despite the fact that the UPWOC had introduced into
evidence 147 membership cards signed by employees in the unit in 1938 and
petitions signed by 141 bargaining unit employees only two months before the
hearing.... It was one of the first NLRB decisions in which William Leiserson
participated, and he was assumed to have been responsible for the departure
from precedent since the Cudahy decision was consistent with the practice of the
National Mediation Board, which Leiserson had chaired.
Id. at 105-06 (footnotes omitted).
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By 1939 . . .the Board decided that generally elections would be

the best basis for certification. Thus any possible doubt would be
removed as to whether the union really was the free choice of the
employees. From then on elections were normally used to determine a question of representation in the formal Board-ordered
cases, although occasionally a union was certified on the record
when there had been agreement for a cross-check of union cards
against the company pay roll, as in Carnegie-Illinois Steel in 1942.
Cross-checks continued to be used by agreement in some informal
cases, but there was enough doubt as to whether signed cards were
a trustworthy indication of the wishes of the employees, especially
in the case of certain unions, to argue strongly for the more usual
practice of holding elections. In the later years it became standard
practice in "consent cross-checks" for the Regional Director to post
the result in the plant for five days, giving any interested party a
right to raise objections, before the determination was made
final.

60

Under the 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments to the NLRA, the
NLRB was "permitted... to resolve representation disputes by certification.., only by secret ballot election" 61 and thus an employer could
insist upon a representation election 62 rather than bargain with the
union on the basis of authorization cards notwithstanding a Supreme
Court holding that a duty to bargain could be imposed upon manage63
ment on the basis of cards where there was employer misconduct.
Subsequently, in this century, George W. Bush's Board ("Bush II
Board") held that representation petitions would be entertained by
the agency notwithstanding a voluntary recognition agreement, which
though not accorded union certification status by virtue of the 1947
amendments, nonetheless had previously barred a challenge by another union or the employer to incumbent union representation status.6 4 (It was called the recognition bar.65 ) The Bush II Board held
& EMILY

ACT TO TAFT-HARTLEY,
133-34 (1950).
61. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 585 (1969).
62. Linden Lumber v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301, 309-10 (1974). The union argument,
which failed to carry the day in Linden Lumber, was that the employer's failure to petition
the NLRB-an entitlement gained through the Taft-Hartley amendments-was a basis for
imposing a duty to bargain on the basis of cards. Id.
63. Franks Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702 (1944). In subsequent case law that seems
to have been of little consequence, the NLRB developed a "good faith doubt" standard
that required employers to bargain with unions that presented cards establishing majority
status. SeeJoy Silk Mills, Inc. v. NLRB, 185 F.2d 732, 741 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Aaron Brothers
Co. of Cal., 158 N.L.R.B. 1077, 1078 (1966). See also generally Laura Cooper & Dennis Nolan, The Story ofNLRB v. Gissell Packing: The PracticalLimits of Paternalism,in LABOR LAW
STORIES 191-239 (Laura Cooper & Catherine Fisk eds., 2005). Linden Lumber buried this
approach. Id. at 229.
64. Dana Corp., 351 N.L.R.B. No. 28 (2007).
60.
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that the parties had an obligation to notify the NLRB of such an
agreement and to post a notice for forty-five days, giving a rival union
or individual employees the opportunity to file a representation petition challenging the relationship if there was a 30% showing of interest amongst the employees.
This decision seems to be wrongly decided and an attack upon

the Act's preference for voluntary initiatives that are not contrary to
the law itself. Nonetheless, the NLRB expressed concern even prior to
the Taft-Hartley amendments (even there where the parties were seeking certification, the Regional Director adopted a policy roughly analogous to the recent approach 66 ) that voluntary recognition would not
67
sufficiently take account of the interests of a number of employees.
There is an inherent concern that authorization cards may be the
product of peer pressure, rather than a more pristine version of employee free choice, and are a process fundamentally different from
the secrecy involved in a ballot box process. 68 Where bargaining orders have been predicated upon cards-these are the so-called Gissel
65. A recognition bar gives the parties a sense of stability and breathing space to establish their relationship and to negotiate a collective bargaining agreement. Keller Plastics
Eastern, Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. 583, 587 (1966). As the Supreme Court said a half-century ago:
"A union should be given ample time for carrying out its mandate on behalf of its members, and should not be under exigent pressure to produce hothouse results or be turned
out." Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 100 (1954); see also Smith's Food & Drug Ctrs., Inc., 320
N.L.R.B. 844, 847-48 (1996) (Gould, Chairman, concurring); Douglas-Randall, Inc., 320
N.L.R.B. 431, 434 (1995). 1 have articulated this position in the press as well: "'If a union
can obtain recognition without going to us, they will always be better off,' [Gould] said.
'There is more delay going through us.'" Frank Swoboda, To the AFL-CIO, There's No Place
Like Home; Unions Increasingly Turn to Door-to-Door Organizing,Bypassing Employer Opposition,
WASH. POST, Mar. 16, 1997, at HI.
66. The decisions of the 1930s, however, were different because in these cases, the
union itself was petitioning the NLRB for certification. This contrasts with the Bush II
Board cases where the parties themselves have negotiated procedures without reference to
the NLRB-and yet the NLRB interferes at its own initiative.
67. See generally MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 329 N.L.R.B. 464 (1999) (finding that "in
balancing the competing goals of effectuating free choice while promoting voluntary recognition.., the purposes of the Act are best served by finding that a reasonable time had
not elapsed at the time the instant petitions were filed."). The NLRB recognized, however,
that "[t]he voluntary recognition bar extends for a reasonable period, not in perpetuity."
Id.
68. Note, Union Authorization Cards,75 YALE L.J. 805, 823-25 (1966). According to this
author:
Even in the case of cards which clearly authorize the union to seek bargaining
without an election, the absence of secrecy makes threats of wage and seniority
reprisal and promises to waive initiation fees more than mere predictions. True,
the union cannot, at the time, enforce its threats. But since his signature will be a
matter of public record, the undecided employee must carefully assess the possible consequences of being counted in the minority should enough fellow em-
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bargaining orders which are triggered by various forms of employer
misconduct making the expression of free choice through the ballot
unlikely-disputes frequently arise about whether the cards and majority status were obtained through misrepresentation, 69 fraud, 70 or
coercion. 7 1 The date at which the card is signed can raise questions
about whether they are stale and therefore improperly counted towards majority status.
Frequently, workers have signed cards for more than one
union. 72 Not always a deliberate process, a compulsory card check
mechanism, as a replacement for a ballot so frequently abused by employers, is the substitute of one imperfect process for another.
Thus, authorization cards or a card check procedure are going to
be a very tough sell with any Congress, even among some Democrats
in the heavily Democratic Congress of 2009, as well as Republicans.
There are three reasons why: (1) the concerns about peer pressure
just expressed and disputes about the circumstances under which
cards are obtained; (2) the fact that unions will organize more employees under such procedures because it is easier to do so, thus accentuating the resistance on the part of some members of Congress
ployee sign. And, as in elections, each instance of union coercion and
misrepresentation overturns only one vote.
In short, the coercive effect of union statements made during an authorization
card drive is entirely different from that of statements made in a secret ballot
campaign. A union organizing by means of authorization cards is in at least as
effective a position to coerce as is an employer in a secret ballot campaign.
Id. at 827 (citations omitted).
69. See, e.g., Cumberland Shoe Corp., 144 N.L.R.B. 1268, 503 (1963).
70. See, e.g.,
Dahlstrom Metallic Door Co., 11 N.L.R.B. 408, 414 (1939). The Canadian
system imposes sanctions on unions for the commission of fraud. For example, see Fabricland Pacific, Ltd. v. Int'l Ladies' Garment Worker's Union, Local 287, B.C.L.R.B. No. B53/99
(1999), where the British Columbia Board disallowed certification when a single card had
been signed by one employee for another one. Id.
71. See, e.g.,
Belmont Stamping & Enameling Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 378, 380 (1936). Since
cards have not been the basis for establishing representative status, the frequency of litigation in this area pales in comparison with employer abuses in elections. But even in relatively non-litigious Canada, there have been many controversies of this type. SeeJEFFRY SACK
& C. MICHAEL MITCHELL, ONTARIO LABOUR RELATIONS BOARD LAW AND PRACTICE 176-213
(2d ed. 1985).
72. See Midwest Piping & Supply Co., 63 N.L.R.B. 1060 (1945); see also id. at 1077 n.13
("[I] t is well known that membership cards obtained during the heat of rival organizing
campaigns like those of the respondent's plants, do not necessarily reflect the ultimate
choice of a bargaining representative; indeed, the extent of dual membership among the
employees during periods of intense organizing activity is an important unknown factor
affecting a determination of majority status, which can best be resolved by a secret ballot
among the employees.").
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who are hostile to unions; and (3) the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act itself.
Concern about peer pressure has led me to write that the Employee Free Choice Act should have an amendment that requires a
supermajority to impose recognition through certification. 73 A
supermajority requirement would partially allay concerns, unease, or
doubt about whether a majority of employees in fact supported collective bargaining. Similarly, in my judgment, my proposal that some limited dues or initiation fees be required in order to count the cardsthis was adopted at one point by some Canadian provinces7 4 and continues to be the policy in the Canadian province of New Brunswick 75 -would be evidence that the workers thought seriously about
the benefits and burdens of unionization. Such a requirement would
show that the worker is not simply signing the card to get the union
organizer off his back. One difficulty with this approach is that it is at
cross-purposes with union attempts to waive any form of dues or monetary requirement in an organizational campaign as an inducement to
join. 76 Still, if cards are to be the basis for recognition as the Employee

Free Choice Act has contemplated, it seems that the payment of dues
or some portion thereof is an important prerequisite so as to manifest
a deliberative process.
Another concern with cards is that some of the same problems
involved with delay in ballot box votes will affect this procedure. After
all, in the first instance, the same disputes over the appropriate unit
and eligibility of employees to vote 77 (e.g., who is a supervisor and
73. GOULD, AGENDA FOR REFORM, supra note 9, at 215; William B. Gould IV, Employee
Free Choice Act: Bill No Cure-All for What Ails Labor, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Mar. 6, 2007, at
SlIA.
74. See, e.g., GEORGE W. ADASS, CANADIAN LABOUR LAW: A COMPREHENSIVE TEXT 353
(2d ed. 1993) (section 7.8); DOUGLAS GILBERT ET AL., CANADIAN LABOUR AND EMPLOY.MlENT
LAW FOR THE U.S. PRACTITIONER 42-55 (2000) (describing certification procedures of trade
unions in Canadian provinces).
75. Memorandum from the New Brunswick Labour Relations Board and Alberta Labour Relations Board (on file with author).
76. See generally NLRB v. Whitney Museum of Art, 645 F.2d 506 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that a union's conduct is lawful if a waiver of initiation fees and a lower-than-usual dues
structure are open to all employees regardless of whether they support or vote for the
union); Molded Acoustical Prods., 280 N.L.R.B. 1394 (1986), enforced, 815 F.2d 934 (3d
Cir. 1987) (holding that it is lawful for a union to promise it will lower initiation fees if the
union wins the election because there is no improper inducement to sign authorization
cards). But see NLRB v. Savair Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 270 (1973) (holding that it is unlawful for
unions to waive the fees of only those employees who sign authorization cards).
77. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (2002).
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who is an employee covered by the Act 78 ) will still arise. This has
caused delay in the election machinery and will cause delay in connection with cards as well. The fact that employers have become sophisticated in exploiting NLRA loopholes and delaying the electoral
process is responsible, as much as anything else, for the law's ineffectiveness in promoting freedom of association and collective bargaining as was initially intended. That problem will not evaporate in a new
card check era-though with an authorization card regime there may
be less incentive to delay because the votes in the form of executed
cards will be in the bank already, undisturbed by anything other than
the possibility of worker petitions repudiating what they have signed.
Moreover, though the EFCA is silent on this issue and the NLRB
will be required to make regulations, it makes sense for the amendments to follow Canadian law and to not allow the employer to examine cards. 79 However, in subsequent unfair labor practice
proceedings-unless EFCA precludes them-presumably in some instances the employer might have an opportunity to examine the cards
and examine witnesses, as it does under existing law, where employer
misconduct triggers a bargaining order. If there is greater scope for
subsequent employer examination of cards, the employer will have
every incentive to litigate after the representation proceeding
concludes.
Very much related to this is another problem peculiar to cards,
i.e., disputes over their authenticity. The signature must always be
matched against the employer payroll, though this is a relatively insignificant part of the process. This is what the NLRB does under election machinery as it determines whether there is a sufficient "showing
of interest" in order to meet the 30% threshold of employee support
for an election, or collective bargaining, and thus to conduct an election at all.80 Nothing more is required-there is no hearing about
whether the cards lack authenticity or whether they have been improperly produced and signed.
But, as noted above, in unfair labor practice proceedings, the issues that most often arise involve questions relating to coercion,
fraud, and misrepresentation on the union's part. Testimony about
this matter, whatever the proof standards used by the NLRB to assess
the validity of the cards, will be time consuming and vexatious. This
78. GOULD, PRIMER, supra note 25, at 35-37.
79. SACK & MITCHELL, supra note 71, at 179.
80. Pursuant to its rules and regulations, the NLRB does this so as to verify bargaining
unit composition-not to verify the authenticity of the signatures themselves.

Fall 2008]

THE EFCA AND LABOR LAW REFORM

introduces a new issue, along with disputes about units and eligibility,
which will create an additional barrier to expeditious resolution of
representation issues. In contrast, at the vote at the secret ballot box,
the NLRB resolves such issues administratively without litigation. It
cannot do so when cards are a basis for recognition rather than a
"showing of interest" (the prerequisite for triggering an election), introducing an element always present in unfair labor practice charges
that seek recognition as a remedy8 1 for employer misconduct when
employers and employees may challenge card validity.
Penultimately, nothing in the reforms relating to union organizational activity is designed to limit non-coercive employer anti-union
speech. This issue overshadows 8 2 all others, and it is particularly perni-

cious when management truthfully tells workers that they can be permanently replaced during a strike8 3 or that it will close the plant
84
permanently.
As noted below, some employers have voluntarily refrained from
speech. Not only is this beyond the policy today, but in all probability,
regulation by Congress prohibiting non-coercive speech would be unconstitutional under more than six-decade-old precedent. 85 It is em81. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 579 (1969); see also United Mine Workers v. Ark. Oak Flooring, Co., 351 U.S. 62, 75 (1956) (holding that a state court may not
enjoin peaceful picketing of the employer's premises, undertaken by its employees and
their union for the purpose of obtaining recognition of the union as the employees' bargaining representative, when the union holds cards authorizing such representation concededly signed by a majority of the employ eligible to be represented); cf William B. Gould
IV, Taft-Hartley Comes to Great Britain: Observations on the IndustrialRelations Act of 1971, 81
YALE. LJ. 1421 (1972).
82. Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53, 62 (1966) ("We acknowledge
that the enactment of § 8(c) manifests a congressional intent to encourage free debate on
issues dividing labor and management. And, as we stated in another context, cases involving speech are to be considered against the background of a profound commitment to the
principle that debate should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well
include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks.") (footnotes and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Brown, 128 S.
Ct. 2408 (2008).
83. See generally Eagle Comtronics, Inc., 263 N.L.R.B. 515 (1982) (discussing the minimal degree of detail required of an employer who informs employees that they are subject
to replacement in the event of a strike).
84. See generally Textile Workers v. Darlington Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965) (holding that an
employer has an absolute right under the NLRA to terminate his entire business for any
reason he pleases, including antiunion motives).
85. See NLRB v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469, 477 (1941); Thomas v. Collins,
323 U.S. 516, 537-38 (1945). "[The Act] contemplates selection by employees of their
bargaining representatives free from employer interference. Such freedom on the part of
employees imports a correlative study on the part of employers to maintain complete neutrality with respect to an election conducted to ascertain bargaining representatives." Am.
Tube Bending Co., Inc., 44 N.L.R.B. 121, 129 (1942) (citations omitted), enforcement denied

UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

ployer anti-union speech and literature, both coercive and noncoercive, which is even more important than the form of recognition.
Moreover, recognition on the basis of cards will spawn a new round of
litigation about the extent to which employers can interrogate employees; the previously held NLRB view that interrogations are unlawful per se86 is now a part of long-ago labor law history. It will also
promote unlawful surveillance 8 7 as employers attempt to get the jump
on labor organizers and preemptively strike against the union
campaign.
Finally, employer resistance will be accentuated by the need for a
statutory provision that sets forth arbitration procedures subsequent
to recognition, a matter discussed below. I rather doubt that employers, to whom accommodations must be made on this subject if reform
proponents are to find the necessary support beyond the labor movement itself, will go quietly into the night on both issues simultaneously. And, as noted above, the fact that these two statutory provisions
are closely linked together is visible when one looks at how parties
operate on the ground. This means to me that there must be a very
serious exploration of the electoral process itself and thought given to
how this more acceptable avenue can be expedited and streamlined
so that employee free choice can be realized. The same holds true for
the arbitration process itself.
sub. nom., NLRB v. Am. Tube Bending Co., 134 F.2d 993 (2d Cir. 1943). Of course, the
Taft-Hartley amendments wrote coercion into the Act. See Gissel, 395 U.S. at 617; Brown,
128 S. Ct. at 2409; see also Craig Becker, Democracy in the Workplace: Union Representation
Elections and FederalLabor Law, 77 MINN. L. REV. 495, 512 (1993).
Of course, some speech, particularly that which evokes or incites racial hatred, has
been regulated in some measure. See Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66 (1962). For a different approach, see Shepherd Tissue, Inc., 326 N.L.R.B. 369, 369-73 (1998) (Gould, Chairman,
concurring). Workplace free speech for unions, employers, and employees is central to the
NLRA. See Novotel N.Y., 321 N.L.R.B. 624, 628 (1996); Caterpillar, Inc., 321 N.L.R.B. 1178,
1184-88 (1996) (Gould, Chairman, concurring); Eldorado Tool, 325 N.L.R.B. 222, 225-27
(1997) (Gould, Chairman, concurring in part and dissenting in part). For an excellent
general discussion, see Catherine L. Fisk, Union Lawyers and Employment Law, 23 BERKELEYJ.
EMp. & LAB. L. 57 (2002) (discussing the issues facing union lawyers in the enforcement of
non-union employee rights).
86. See generally Standard-Coosa-Thatcher Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 1358 (1949) (affirming the
position "that Section 8(a) (1) of the Act is violated when an employer interrogates his
employees concerning any aspect of union activity"), overruled by Blue Flash Express, Inc.,
109 N.L.R.B. 591 (1954).
87. See generally Nat'l Steel & Shipbuilding Co., 324 N.L.R.B. 499 (1996) (holding that
while "observation of open, public union activity on or near its property doesn't constitute
unlawful surveillance," photographic and videotaped observation goes beyond mere observation and creates fear among employees), enforced, 156 F.3d 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
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The Ballot Box-How Can It Be Reformed?

There are four major problems with the ballot box under American labor law as currently written. The first is that a hearing must be
conducted 8 8-and for the most part, completed-before a vote is
taken on issues. The hearing focuses upon appropriate unit or eligibility issues. Though approximately 80% of the representation proceedings are completed within fifty to sixty days, this is by virtue of
stipulated agreements entered into, in which the union frequently
must make concessions because it knows that a full-fledged hearing
and an appeal to the NLRB in Washington will be extremely time consuming. The remaining 20% of them are a Bleak House-like nightmare, running on into months and years!
A second and related issue is that the appeal to the NLRB can
take an extraordinary amount of time under any scenario. The parties
may wish to agree to be bound by the rulings of the Regional Director
and thus deny themselves an appeal, but an overwhelming percentage
of parties do not. Appeals to Washington are a black hole in which the
NLRB can hold the case indefinitely and frequently does. But beyond
this, though representation orders are not "final" within the meaning
of the Act, 89 they can be appealed through the unfair labor practice
process because an employer, when confronted with rulings in connection with such unit and eligibility issues it does not like, can simply
sit back and refuse to bargain. Thus, requiring refusal to bargain
charges to be filed is a phenomenon likely to increase under the Act.
Notwithstanding the fact that since the 1990s, the NLRB has dealt
88. See generally Angelica Healthcare Servs., 315 N.L.R.B. 1320 (1995) (finding that
the Acting Regional Director violated the language of section 9(c) (1) of the NLRA and
section 102.63(a) of the Board's Rules by failing to provide an appropriate hearing prior to
finding that a question concerning representation existed, and directing that an election
be held).
89. Am. Fed'n of Labor v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401, 409 (1940) ("[T]he entire structure of
the Act emphasizes, for purposes of review, the distinction between an 'order' of the NLRB
restraining an unfair labor practice and a certification in representation proceedings. The
one authorized by § 10 may be reviewed by the court on petition of the NLRB for enforcement of the other, or of a person aggrieved, in conformity to the procedure laid down in
§ 10, which says nothing of certifications. The other order, authorized by § 9, is nowhere
spoken of as an order, and no procedure is prescribed for its review apart from an order
prohibiting an unfair labor practice. The exclusion of representation proceedings from
the review secured by the provisions of § 10(f) is emphasized by the clauses of § 9(d),
which provide for certification by the NLRB of a record of a representation proceeding
only in the case when there is a petition for review of an order of the NLRB restraining an
unfair labor practice. The statute on its face thus indicates a purpose to limit the review
afforded by § 10 to orders of the NLRB prohibiting unfair labor practices, a purpose and a
construction which its legislative history confirms.").
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with these in a fairly summary and expeditious fashion, they do take
time. 90 And since unfair labor practice charges may be reviewed by the
circuit courts of appeal, a new layer of review which builds in a time
period of two to three to four years comes into play in those cases in
which the employer does not abide by the NLRB's order. 9 1 Even if the
appeal is not taken, the threat of one affects what the union will settle
for in order to commence collective bargaining.
Finally, some representation issues have been litigated again and
again for as many as four decades, and under the adjudication model
traditionally favored by the NLRB, they must be adjudicated each time
anew. 92 In the 1990s, my Board attempted to engage in rulemaking on
such issues so that it could establish clear standards; for example, in
disputes about whether a representation election should be held in a
single location as opposed to multi-location facilities of an employer.
But Congress imposed a rider on the NLRB's appropriations bill precluding us from engaging in such activity. Ultimately, over my dissent, 93 the NLRB withdrew its proposed rulemaking. This matter is
important not only because it has a potential for reducing unnecessary and wasteful litigation on issues that have been decided for years,
but also because it may serve an important issue, addressed below, i.e.,
the depoliticization of the NLRB. A newly constituted Obama Board,
coexisting with the Democratic Congress, could finally accomplish
this and fashion a rulemaking approach to other issues for which this
approach is long overdue.
IV.

Election Machinery

The main election problem relates to the speed in which the process can be conducted. My Board attempted to move ahead with elections before numerous issues of eligibility were resolved, agreeing to
BD., NLRB CASEHANDLING MANUAL, 1 UNFAIR LABOR PRAc§ 10,025 (2008), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/legal/manuals/
INITIATION%200F%20CASES%2010010%2010040.pdf.
91. The NLRB and any party "aggrieved" may petition the relevant circuit court of
appeals. Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423, 426-27 (1969). This review can lead to appropriate unit reversals. NLRB v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 438, 444 (1965).
92. Ever since the early 1960s, the NLRB has held that the single unit is presumptively
appropriate. See Sav-on Drugs Inc., 138 N.L.R.B. 1032, 1033, 1035 (1962); Frisch's Big Boy
Ill-Mar, Inc., 147 N.L.R.B. 551, 553 (1964), enforcement denied, 356 F.2d 895 (7th Cir. 1966);
F.W. Woolworth Co., 173 N.L.R.B. 1146, 1147 (1968); Dixie Belle Mills, Inc., 139 N.L.R.B.
629, 631 (1962); Metro. Life Ins. Co., 156 N.L.R.B. 1408, 1414 & n.16 (1966); Bowie Hall
Trucking, Inc., 290 N.L.R.B. 41, 42 (1988).
93. GOULD, LABORED RELATIONS, supra note 15, at 69-74.

90.

NAT'L LABOR RELATIONS

TICE PROCEEDINGS
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resolve them subsequent to the ballot if the numbers of individuals
contested turned out to be determinative of the election outcome.
In a number of Canadian jurisdictions, the representation vote
takes place prior to a formal hearing of any kind. This occurs in British Columbia, where an informal hearing, at which not all issues are
required to be resolved, takes place within five to six days of the filing
of a representation petition. A ballot is conducted on an average of
seven days subsequent to the filing of the petition because the statute
requires that it take place within ten days. In New Brunswick, a vote is
generally taken between four to seven days of a Board's order, which
takes place simultaneously with the filing of a certification petition. In
Ontario, which, like most of Canada, has now moved to elections, the
Labour Board moves quickly: 80.57% of elections take place within
five days or less of application for certification, 96.69% take place
94
within seven days or less of it, and 100% take place within ten days.
Disputes about eligibility to vote are frequently resolved afterwards,
95
either by agreement or adjudication by the NLRB.
A basic difference between this and the American system is that
some form of hearing leading to adjudication, which results in the
ordering of an election, must take place prior to the vote. My Board
held in Angelica Health Care Services Group Inc.9 6 that a hearing in some
form is required prior to the election, though there have been many
disputes about precisely what this means. For instance, during my tenure, a unanimous Board held that where an employer did not take a
position about an issue in dispute in a representation hearing, the
hearing officer properly refused to allow the employer to introduce
evidence as to that issue thus properly denying re-litigation of the
same issue through the challenge ballot process. 97 Similarly, re-litigation of issues on the appropriateness of a single facility unit advanced
by the same employer at a different facility was precluded so as to
avoid wastefulness and delay.98 Thus, in the 1990s, the NLRB emphasized that the role of the hearing officer in a representation proceeding is to ensure that the process through which one votes now and
litigates later over issues relating to unit and eligibility is much more
94.

ONT. LABOUR RELATIONS BD., OLRB ANNUAL REPORT, 2006-2007, at 29 (2007)

available at http://www.olrb.gov.on.ca/English/AnnRep0607.pdf.
95. According to recent data, the Ontario Board manages to resolve 89.4% of disputes
related to certification in 168 days or less. Id. at 20.
96. 315 N.L.R.B. 1320, 1321 (1995).
97. Bennett Industries Inc., 313 N.L.R.B. 1363, 1363 (1994).
98. HeartShare Human Servs., 320 N.L.R.B. 1, 3 (1995), enforced, 108 F.3d 467, 470-71
(2d Cir. 1998).
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expeditious and presumably protects against the delay that corrodes
employee free choice.
But inasmuch as the American system requires a formal hearing
of some kind on the merits, the American NLRB lacks the discretion
that is available to their Canadian counterparts. Prior to my Chairmanship, the NLRB's policy was to approve election agreements between parties that provided up to 10% of the voting group to be
subject to challenge at the ballot box, and if necessary, because the
number of employees challenged was outcome determinative, after
the vote itself. Of course, where the number in dispute is not outcome
determinative, once the votes initially cast are counted, there is no
need to resolve these. This practice 9 9-one that has a modified version of vote now and litigate later (modified because it presupposes
that some hearing must take place prior to the ballot) is engaged in
where the number of people in dispute is numerous and where the
issue would require detailed hearings and findings. The Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the NLRB is enabled to "conduct an immediate election where ...

it is undecided about the eligibility of a rela-

tively small number of individuals whose votes may not affect the
election. The question of eligibility may be resolved after the election
through the Board's unit clarifying procedure." 100
The principal line of attack on this approach is that the outcome
of the election would be different if the employees knew the scope of
the unit entitled to vote. The reasoning is that the inclusion or exclusion of employees may affect employee decisions about how their interests will be best represented. Said the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals: "Challenges to a regional director's eligibility determination
frequently involve only the inclusion or exclusion of a few voters and,
even if successful, may not change significantly the scope of the
unit."'01
But the court, in this case, concluded that the NLRB's approach
improperly split the work force and that employees might have voted
99. Even conservative congressman Robert Griffin of Michigan, author of the Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959, stated the following two years later: "If the controversy involves a
bargaining unit, it might be one situation; but if the dispute concerns, for example, challenged ballots, the Board might be able to proceed with the election and decide the challenged ballot questions later. Different problems may call for different remedies." Pucinski
Hearings, supra note 9, at 26-27.
100. Medical Ctr. at Bowling Green v. NLRB, 712 F.2d 1091, 1093 (6th Cir. 1983).
101. Hamilton Test Sys., N.Y., Inc. v. NLRB, 743 F.2d 136, 140 (2d Cir. 1984). See also
generally Diamond Walnut Growers, Inc., 308 N.L.R.B. 933 (1992) (holding that eligibility
determinations were postponed because of statutory deadlines).
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differently had they known the true nature of the unit; for instance:
(1) they might have felt that a smaller bargaining unit would provide
"insufficient strength tojustify union representation"; (2) more skilled
employees might not have wished to have union representation with a
lower tier of employees who had less pay and opportunities for advancement so as to garner future opportunities for themselves; (3) a
broader unit might establish a more unified work force and employees might have been concerned about divisiveness and "undesirable
tensions"; and (4) "interpersonal relationships within the plant might
have made an individual employee comfortable with a facility-wide
unit but caused concern and distress over leadership in a smaller
10 2
unit."
However these decisions, especially insofar as they impose a requirement of a small number of employees in dispute as a prerequisite for the NLRB approach, improperly trump the NLRB's expertise.
The NLRB has traditionally followed a policy of allowing as much as
15% of the unit and the voting group to vote subject to challenge.
Again, this is viewed as infinitely preferable to contentious and timeconsuming litigation when employees must wait substantial periods of
time during which employer counterattacks, lawful and otherwise,
may take place for months or longer. Employees, seeing their conditions frozen in place,10 3 may grow frustrated with the idea of unionization regardless of the employer response. These considerations must
be balanced against concerns about complete lack of knowledge
amongst employees as to the group that they voting in. This concern
was expressed by the Court of Appeals as noted above.
Where 20% were in dispute, my Board expedited the election,
leaving eligibility issues to be resolved. We held that this amount did
not signify a "significant change in character and scope to warrant
setting aside the election ....,o4 In 1994, the NLRB proceeded to
102. Hamilton, 743 F.2d at 141.
103. NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co. held that the bestowal of benefits during a union organizational campaign is unlawful. 375 U.S. 405, 409 (1964) ("The danger inherent in welltimed increases in benefits is the suggestion of a fist inside the velvet glove. Employees are
not likely to miss the inference that the source of benefits now conferred is also the source
from which future benefits must flow and which may dry up if it is not obliged."). However,
increases in benefits promised prior to the union organizational campaign may be granted
because the test is whether an employer is proceeding "as if the union were not on the
scene." United Methodist Home of N.J., 314 N.L.R-B. 687, 687 (1994).
104. Toledo Hosp., 315 N.L.R.B. 594, 594 (1994) (Cohen, Member, dissenting). The
NLRB then relied upon Toledo Hospital to say that
the exclusion of one classification from a facilitywide service and maintenance
unit comprised of employees in nine other specifically named classifications, rep-
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ballot in units where 33% of the voters in one unit and 22% of the
voters in the other were in dispute. 105 Again, the same position was
followed where the anticipated percentage of challenged ballots was
1
37.5%. 06

In 1998, the NLRB held an election where 27% of the ballots
were in dispute and the challenged number was actually 700 voters. 10 7
The hearing on those individuals would have consumed months if not
years! In fact, in this particular case and in most of those alluded to
above, it was not necessary to have a hearing subsequent to the vote
because the numbers in dispute were not outcome determinative.10 8
This highlights another deficiency in the judicial approach, which is
the speculative nature of decisions predicated upon the fact that a
large number of voters may result in subsequent litigation about their
status because they are likely to be outcome determinative.
Even the Bush II Board was comparable to the Clinton Board
numbers in not allowing similar numbers of employees to vote under
challenge. It adhered to the view that "[t] he challenge procedure is a
well-established method through which the Board ensures the speedy
running of representation elections."10 9 In Northeast Iowa Telephone,' 1 0
the NLRB, while concluding that the situation was not "optimal," allowed a vote subject to subsequent challenge of 25% of the unit under
this procedure. Indeed, even where there was no occasion to resolve
the issue in a ballot challenge hearing, my Board said that "the issue
need not stay unresolved. If the parties do not subsequently agree on
whether to add them to the unit, the matter can be resolved in a
timely invoked unit clarification proceeding."''
One approach, which might be contained in the Employee Free
Choice Act, would be to promote case law encouraging the "vote now
resents a numerical change which we, contrary to the Regional Director, do not
view as signifying a sufficient change in unit size to warrant setting aside of the
election.
Morgan Manor Nursing & Rehab. Ctr., 319 N.L.R.B. 552, 553 (1995).
105. See WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, FOUR-AND-ONE HALF YEAR REPORT 22 (1998) (on file
with author).
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. Id.
109. Northeast Iowa Tel. Co., 341 N.L.R.B. 670, 670-71 (2004). The NLRB stated:
"While we recognize that allowing 25 percent of the electorate to vote subject to challenge
is not optimal, the Employer's opportunity to raise its supervisory issues remains preserved
through appropriate challenges and objections to the election or through a subsequent
unit clarification petition." Id. at 671.
110. Id.
111. Sundor Brands, Inc., 325 N.L.R.B. 499, 501 (1998).

Fall 2008]

THE EFCA AND LABOR LAW REFORM

litigate later" approach to challenged ballots. The best amendment
would be one that replicates statutes/policies in provinces like British
Columbia and Ontario, and while promoting some kind of meeting or
informal hearing on an expedited basis, i.e., five or six days subsequent to the filing of the petition, would then mandate an election
within seven to ten days (perhaps one or two days subsequent to the
parties initial meeting) of the petition filing. Ontario requires the vote
to be held within five days, while British Columbia requires it to be
held within ten days.
But there must be other changes in the law as well. As noted
above, under existing law the parties can have career civil servants, the
regional directors, resolve all issues relating to units, eligibility, and
objections to the conduct of the election after it takes place without
an appeal to Washington. Since 2005, unions and employers may
enter into consent agreements that preclude an appeal to Washington
of issues before or subsequent to the conduct of the election. It appears, however, that this process is infrequently used. It should be
mandated by law, considering that appeals to Washington are a major
part of the problem of delay. Indeed, some cases have sat in Washington for years. The NLRB should be obliged to determine why a Regional Director's decision conflicts with existing law or how it
contradicts some policy before review is granted. And the statute must
mandate that the NLRB act on these matters within thirty to sixty days.
(The problem of inducing or assuring that the NLRB will adhere to a
time guideline is something that I revisit below.)
Congress must revise existing case law that allows appeals to be
taken of certification issues through the unfair labor practice machinery. The NLRB's order in this arena is deemed to be "non-final" under
the National Labor Relations Act because of Congress's appropriate
preference for expeditious resolution of representation cases without
judicial review, which can only occur when an order is final. Yet judicial review, always available in unfair labor practice proceedings, has
been obtained indirectly by allowing employers to simply refuse to
bargain and to litigate issues that they have lost in the representation
matter through the unfair labor practice process, taking two to three
years in the process. 112 At this moment, it appears that a very small
112. See, e.g., Goya Foods of Fla., 347 N.L.R.B. No. 103 (discussing a situation where the
union won an election in 1998, union leaders were dismissed in 1999, and the union ultimately obtained reinstatement in 2006); see also William B. Gould IV, Independent Adjudication, PoliticalProcess, and the State of Labor-ManagementRelations: The Role of the NationalLabor
Relations Board, 82 IND. L.J. 461, 481 (2007).
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percentage of cases1 13 are appealed to the courts. But there is no reason why the agency's decision on such matters cannot be deemed as
final and binding with no appeal allowed; the Supreme Court has
14
never held that Congress may not act in this fashion.'
V.

Conditional Recognition

American labor law, particularly as interpreted by the NLRB, establishes a rather artificial demarcation line between organizational
disputes and the collective bargaining process itself. Nearly five decades ago, the Supreme Court held that it was an unfair labor practice
for an employer to recognize a union as the exclusive bargaining representative when the union represented only a minority of employees
within the unit and it was unlawful to accord recognition even when
the employer believed in good faith that the union represented a majority.' 5 Yet, the fact is that many organizing disputes arise out of employer perceptions about the impact of union demands upon work
rules, job classifications, and costs as well as what the parties will likely
negotiate, and employees get lost in the haze of competing propaganda. Though the NLRB has upheld as lawful some labor-management agreements about whom the union will organize and under
what circumstances, 1 6 it has relied upon extant Supreme Court pre113. On NLRB Representation Elections and Initial Collective Bargaining Agreements: Safeguarding Workers' Rights, Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on Education and Labor,
110th Cong. (Apr. 2, 2008) (testimony of Peter C. Schaumber Chairman, NLRB).
114. But see Rodney Smolla, Is Paulson's Bailout Constitutional?,SLATE, Sept. 24, 2008,
http://www.slate.com/id/2200817/pagenum/all/. Another approach is to allow review
where there is manifest inconsistency with explicit provisions of the law. See generally Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958) (holding that a federal district court had jurisdiction of
an original suit to set aside the determination because it was made in excess of the Board's
powers).
115. See generally Int'l Ladies Garment Union v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731 (1961) (holding
that it was an unfair labor practice for an employer to recognize a union as the exclusive
bargaining representative of certain employees on a date when only a minority of those
employees had authorized the union to represent their interests, and a good faith belief in
the union's majority status was not an excuse).
116. Lexington Health Care Group, L.L.C., 328 N.L.R.B. 894, 897 (1999) (holding that
unions may make agreements which limit organizing). A somewhat controversial variation
on the bargaining for recognition theme has emerged in the Service Employees International Union in connection with its recognition agreements negotiated in secrecy. The
debate about this policy is described in Steven Greenhouse, A Leader at the Point of Union
Growth and Criticism,N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 29, 2008, at Al 7. See also Kris Maher, Unions Forge Secret
Pacts with Major Employers, WALL ST. J., May 10, 2008, at Al, A8; Kris Maher, SEU Moves to
Consolidate its Power, WALL STJ., June 9, 2008, at A3; George Raine, SEIU May Consolidate 3
Groups, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 3, 2009, at CI ("Opponents [of SEIU organizational plans], and
in particular Sal Rosselli, the president of United Healthcare Workers-West, lambaste the
international union president, Andy Stern, for what Rosselli says is a top-down manage-
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cedent to hold that it is unlawful for the union and employer to bargain about wages, hours, and conditions of work prior to the time that
the union attains a majority, even if the bargaining is conditioned
upon the union's success in recruiting a majority of employees within
117
the unit.
But this conflicts with the way a number of unions and employers
conduct themselves in the real world. For instance, at the GM-Toyota
joint venture NUMMI in Fremont, California, recognition was accorded to the UAW at the company once the parties had negotiated
with one another about the number of job classifications and other
arrangements that would come into existence if statutory recognition
was accorded. 118 All of this was done sub silentio. But the arrangement
through which recognition was provided to the UAW at General Motor's ("GM") new Saturn plant was done through an explicit arrangement that resulted in NLRA litigation."19 The NLRB has allowed the
parties to negotiate substantive terms when the object of the contract
clauses in question was new "greenfields," which are previously unorganized additional stores to a multi-location bargaining unit. 120 But, it
has not answered the question of whether this "greenfield" exception
to the proposition that agreements cannot be negotiated prior to recognition can apply to a situation where the contract in question has
been negotiated in a different bargaining unit at different locations
21
and where the "greenfield" facility will require a separate election.
The NLRB's current approach makes no sense whatsoever. If employers know what the union is willing to agree to and vice versa, the
ment style that does not engage workers. He said Stern's practice is to negotiate contracts
with weakened worker provisions in exchange for employers' willingness not to stand in
the way of union organizing efforts.").
117. See Majestic Weaving Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 859, (1964), enforcement denied on other
grounds, 355 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1966).
118. William B Gould IV, Does the Auto Union Have Any "Rights" at Fremont, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 11, 1983, § 2, at 7. But portions of the labor movement do not like this approach:
"'You never trade away contract standards to get organizing rights,' said John Borsos, the
local's administrative vice president. 'We believe you can win both.'" George Raine, Labor
Groups'DisputeTurns Ugly, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 7, 2008, at Dl.
119. See Memorandum from the Office of Gen. Counsel Regarding Case 7-CA-24872,
8-11 (June 2, 1986) (on file with author). Other cases dealing with issues of this kind are
cited in the memorandum. Generally, they arise under section 8(a)(2) of the National
Labor Relations Act.
120. See generally Houston Div. of Kroger Co., 219 N.L.R.B. 388 (1975) (finding that
specific contractual language obligated the employer to bargain with the union after the
employer shifted stores to a separate division and decided to forego the right to the Board
election process).
121. Memorandum from the Office of Gen. Counsel Regarding Tenet Healthcare,Inc.
and CaliforniaNurses Assn. (Feb. 23, 2005) (on file with author).
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inflammatory rhetoric and polarization of organizational campaigns
may be diminished or reduced and, equally important, the employees
permitted to know what the facts of life will be and cast their votes for
the union simultaneous with their votes on the collective bargaining
agreement. Though it can be argued that this resembles a "sweetheart" relationship where labor and management are excessively close
at the expense of the workers, this cannot be the case where employees vote on the union, knowing what collective bargaining will provide
prospectively. A "sweetheart" relationship means that workers are
both ignorant and impotent. So long as all parties know what the facts
are at the time that critical decisions are made about both recognition
and contract, public policy promoting a competitive work force, in
which unions have a role to play, is more likely to be realized. 12 2 This
modification of existing NLRB law could be obtained through reversal
of precedent by the Obama Board or by Congress itself, by amending
the NLRA.
VI.

Post-Recognition Bargaining and the Arbitration Process

The Employee Free Choice Act provides that subsequent to the
employer's recognition of the union, collective bargaining commences "not later than ten days" after a written request for bargaining
by the union, and if no agreement is reached within ninety days, the
parties may initiate third party intervention in the form of a mediator
from the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service who may refer
an unresolved dispute to an interest arbitration panel which will issue
an award to resolve differences between the parties. 123 No standards
for the arbitrator's decision are written into the version of the bill
passed by the House of Representatives in 2007.124
122.

JOSEPH Z. FLEMING & DANIEL

B.

PASTERNAK,

Am.

BAR ASS'N,

MUTUALITY AGREE-

2-3 (2007); Marshall B. Babson, BargainingBefore Recognition in a Global Market: How Much Will it Cost?, 58
LAB. & EMP. REL. ASS'N SERIES 113 (2006), available at http://www.press.uillinois.edu/journals/irra/proceedings2006/babson.html; Samuel Estreicher, Win-Win LaborLaw Reform, 10
LAB. LAw. 667, 671-73 (1994).
123. Employee Free Choice Act of 2007, H.R. 800, 110th Cong. § 2(h) (3) (2007). Curiously, the period of time established for bargaining prior to arbitration-four months-is
incompatible with the so-called certification year in which it is assumed that bargaining
should take place without concern for representative challenges. See Brooks v. NLRB, 348
U.S. 96, 98-99, 104 (1954) (holding that, in the absence of extraordinary circumstances,
an employer must recognize a union for a "certification year" even if it has evidence that
the union has lost majority status).
124. Bhd. of Locomotive Firemen v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co., 225 F.
Supp. 11, 22-23 (D.D.C.), affid, 331 F.2d 1020 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 918 (1964)
(holding congressionally imposed interest arbitration to be constitutional). Hess CollecMENTS: INNOVATIVE APPROACHES TO THE USE OF NEUTRALITY AGREEMENTS
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It is clear that this is a proper focus of labor law reform and that
some form of first contract intervention, when the parties' relationship is embryonic and fragile, must be fashioned. 125 Professor Thomas
Kochan has written about how difficult it is for first contracts to be
struck in a timely fashion. 126 Among the bargaining units able to make
the showing of support that is necessary for a certification petition to
be filed, only 20% reach a first contract, with merely 12.9% doing so
within a year of certification. 127 Only 56% of newly certified bargaining units are successful in reaching a first contract, and 38% are able
to conclude such a contract within a year. 128 Moreover, the presence
of unfair labor practices reduces the chances of getting to an election
by 25%129 and striking a first contract by 30%.130 The NLRB possesses
tion Winery v. Cal. Agric. Labor Relations Bd., 45 Cal. Rptr. 3d 609, 627 (Ct. App. 2006)
(upholding an interest arbitration statute against a constitutional challenge because the
Act has adequate standards in place to allow for judicial review). More than eighty years
ago, an interest arbitration statutory provision was vulnerable to a substantive due process
attack, which if successful, would render the statute unconstitutional. Chas. Wolff Packing
Co. v. Court of Indus. Relations, 262 U.S.522 (1923); see also Chas. Wolff Packing Co. v.
Court of Indus. Relations, 262 U.S.552 (1925) (finding that an arbitration statute regulating wages and hours is unconstitutional because it interferes with freedom of contract and
due process, respectively); cf Wilson v. New, 243 U.S.332 (1917) (holding, 54, that the
fixing of wages and hours was constitutional where the public interest in the railways was
protected). But this line of authority has been repudiated since the 1930s. See Nebbia v.
New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (finding that the regulation of maximum and minimum
retail prices is constitutional). In the labor-management arena, see Lincoln Fed. Labor Union
v. Nw. Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949) (upholding "right to work" laws prohibiting
union security legislation). CfjJerre S. Williams, The Compulsory Settlement of ContractNegotiation LaborDisputes, 27 TEx. L. REV. 587 (1949) (comprehensively surveying interest arbitration legislation in the U.S. and abroad sixty years ago). Interest arbitration awards in the
private sector are judicially enforceable. See, e.g.,
Builders Ass'n of Kansas City v. Kansas
City Laborers, 326 F.2d 867, 869 (8th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 917 (1964); A. Seltzer
& Co. v. Livingston, 253 F. Supp. 509, 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), affd, 361 F.2d 218 (2d Cir.
1966); Winston-Salem Printing Pressman v. Piedmont Publ'g Co., 393 F.2d 221, 227 (4th
Cir. 1968); Chattanooga Mailers v. Chattanooga News-Free Press, 524 F.2d 1305, 1315 (6th
Cir. 1975). But see Boston Printing Pressmen's Union v. Potter Press, 141 F. Supp. 553,
557-58 (D. Mass. 1956), affd, 241 F.2d 787 (1st Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 817 (1957)
(holding that "quasi-legislative" arbitration is not enforceable). The same principle has
been applied to public sector arbitration. See, e.g.,
Fire Fighters Union v. City of Vallejo, 526
P.2d 971, 975 (Cal. 1974) (upholding compulsory arbitration for fire fighters).
125. See Micah Berul, To Bargain or Not to Bargain Should Not Be the Question: Deterring
Section 8(a)(5) Violations in First-Time BargainingSituations Through a Liberalized Standardfor
the Award of Litigations and Negotiation Costs, 18 LAB. LAw. 27, 30 (2002).
126. John-Paul Ferguson & Thomas A. Kochan, Sequential Failures in Workers' Right
to Organize 1 (Mar. 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
127. Id. at 1.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 3.
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no statistics on this matter,1 31 and the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service has reported that it intervenes to mediate a very large
number of first contract bargaining relationships where the parties
are unable to resolve their differences.
The General Counsel for the NLRB has noted the following:
Initial contract bargaining constitutes a critical stage of the negotiation process because it forms the foundation for the parties' future labor-management relationship. As the Federal Meditation
and Conciliation Service has observed, "[i]nitial contract negotiations are often more difficult than established successor contract
negotiations, since they frequently follow contentious representation election campaigns." And when employees are bargaining for
their first collective bargaining agreement, they are highly susceptible to unfair labor practices intended to undermine support for
their bargaining representative. Indeed our records indicate that
in the initial period after election and certification, charges alleging that employers have refused to bargain are meritorious in more
than a quarter of all newly-certified units (28%). Moreover, of all
charges alleging employer refusals to bargain, almost half occur in
initial contract bargaining situations (49.65%). In addition, half of
the Section 10(j) cases involving ... unfair labor practices that undermine incumbent
unions, involve parties bargaining for first
32
contracts. 1
The General Counsel noted that he viewed the use of section
10(j) bargaining orders as an extension of the one-year NLRB certification year when bargaining is to take place, without any challenge to
the award, the award of bargaining, and litigation expenses to remedy
first contract refusals to bargain. Periodic reports on the status of bar133
gaining have all been used in this context.
Notwithstanding the use of these remedies, the virtue of first contract arbitration, as provided for in the Employee Free Choice Act, is
that the employer is aware it must enter into a collective bargaining
agreement, discouraging surface bargaining, attempts to escape the
strictures of the Act, or engaging in bad faith misconduct. Under
these circumstances, the employer has more of an incentive to negoti131.

This was investigated by the Dunlop Commission. See DUNLOP

MANAGEMENT

COMM'N ON LABOR-

RELATIONS, U.S. COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MGMT. RELATIONS,

Fi-

44 (1994), availableat http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.
cgi?article=1004&context=key workplace.
132. First Contract Bargaining Cases, Memorandum GC 06-05 from the Office of the
Gen. Counsel (Apr. 19, 2006) (on file with author).
133. Report on First Contract Bargaining Cases, Memorandum GC 08-08 from the Office of the Gen. Counsel (May 15, 2008) (on file with author). Additional Remedies in First
Contract Bargaining Cases, Memorandum from the Office of the Gen. Counsel (May 29,
2007) (on file with author).
NAL REPORT
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ate. Correspondingly, the union, if unable to conclude a collective
bargaining agreement, will have declining support within the bargaining unit, because in the United States, the collective bargaining agreement and protections contained in it are the sine qua non for effective
representation.
Yet access to arbitration should not be available at a date certain
because that will allow the party that sees itself at a bargaining disadvantage to simply wait for arbitration. That diminishes incentive to
negotiate. Uncertainty about the precise timing of arbitration will promote voluntary negotiations.
The British Columbia Labour Relations Board paved the way to
Canadian acceptance of first contract arbitration.1 34 In so doing, the
British Columbia Board and its other provincial counterparts struggled with the development of a "screen" or barrier to the process,
though Manitoba has provided automatic access along the lines of the
EFCA so as to expedite settlements.135 Generally, the Canadian focus
has provided arbitration when there is a "breakdown" in negotia137
tions,1 36 and in British Columbia, subsequent to a union strike vote.
134. See generally Yarrow Lodge Ltd., B.C.L.R.B. No. B444/93 (1993).
135. Id. at 23-25.
136. Id. at 20-21, 36-37. The factors alluded to by the NLRB are the following:
1. First collective agreement imposition is a remedy which is designed to address
the breakdown in negotiations resulting from the conduct of one of the parties. It
is not simply an extension of the unfair labour practice remedies for egregious
employer conduct.
2. The process of collective bargaining itself, to whatever extent possible, is to be
encouraged as the vehicle to achieve a first collective agreement.
3. Mediators should be assigned early into first collective agreement disputes in
order to facilitate and encourage the process of collective bargaining and to educate the parties in the practices and procedures of collective bargaining.
4. The timing of the imposition of a first collective agreement (if it is deemed
appropriate that one be imposed) should not be at the end of the negotiation
process when the relationship has broken down and is irreparable, but rather
should take place in a "timely fashion," after the mediator has identified "the
stumbling blocks" in the dispute and what is needed in order to "avoid" an irreparable breakdown in the collective bargaining relationship.
Id. at 36-37.
137. In the United States, there is no strike vote required, and the EFCA does not
make one necessary. In emergency strike cases involving the health and safety of the nation, workers are required to vote on an employer's last offer. Taft-Hartley Act § 209, Pub.
L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 179). Even in British Columbia,
"[i]nterest arbitration is not automatic even if there is a strike vote. And a- a practical
matter, the NLRB will not impose interest arbitration if the parties engage in good faith
bargaining and are far apart." Correspondence with Peter Gall of Heenan Blaikie, Jan. 8,
2009 (e-mail on file with author). The objective in Canadian first contract arbitration is
similar to some of the American bargaining-order cases, that is, to ensure or make likely a
vibrant labor-management relationship. See Gourmet Foods, 270 N.L.R.B. 578 (1984). But
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The theory that only when workers are serious enough to strike in
support of the union can there be viable collective bargaining which
leads to arbitration.13 8 Finally, as is true in some American public sector interest arbitration, provision is made for informal recommendations by the mediator, which may be used in a subsequent arbitration
proceeding.
Another problem with the EFCA is that it does not focus upon
the problem of standards alluded to above. The absence of standards
in the Act, as presently written, will entice unions to seek arbitration
awards which resemble or replicate the best collective bargaining
agreements or master agreements which they have previously negotiated. This will mean that there is less incentive for the union to bargain and that the tables will be quickly turned as the potential for
union obduracy supplants that of the employers. An incentive to bargain for the union, as well as the employer, must be part of the law.
For the employers, one incentive is the reality that some kind of agreement will be imposed upon them if they do not negotiate one, and
their preference to shape their own bargain will be undermined. For
the unions, it must be a realization that, while they are able to obtain a
collective bargaining agreement that is sufficiently attractive to make
future collective bargaining worthwhile, it will be inferior to agreements they have negotiated in comparable circumstances. The EFCA
must explicitly recognize this and stress the employer's peculiar economic circumstance and ability to pay139 as the dominant characteristic to which the arbitrator is required to adhere. Amendments are
needed to accomplish this objective.

see United Dairy Farmers Cooperative Ass'n v. NLRB,633 F.2d 1054, 1070 (3rd Cir. 1980)
(upholding the issuance of a non-majority NLRB bargaining order when the order was
issued because the NLRB found that employer had engaged in unfair labor practices);
Nabors Alaska Drilling, 325 N.L.R.B. 574, 574-77 (1998) (Gould, Chairman, dissenting in
part) (holding that a new election was necessary because the employer violated section
8(a) (1) when it interfered with an election by denying union representatives access to employees who worked on remote Alaskan oil rigs).
138. In Canada, as in other countries outside the United States, striking workers cannot be permanently replaced. See GOULD, AGENDA FOR REFORM, supra note 9, at 198-205,
230-32. In Ontario, however, the right to return to work is limited by the fact that it is an
individual right that must be exercised within six months of the onset of the strike. Id.
139. Here, of course, the employer must be obligated to "open the books" and provide
information supporting its position. Cf NLRB v. Trutit Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 153-54
(1956) (holding that employers have an obligation to disclose financial data when they
plead an inability to pay in collective bargaining).
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Delay in the Statutory Process

However, there is still the problem of delay-a problem which
affects the recognition issue as well as post-certification duty to bargain cases. Many of the delay problems noted above have emerged
since the 1970s because employers have become more sophisticated in
exploiting the administrative process so that it lasts a considerable
amount of time. Most of those matters are addressed above. Although
the Employee Free Choice Act's extension of Section 10(j), i.e., the
NLRB's authority to obtain injunctive relief in certain unfair labor
practices cases, might be particularly useful in representation proceedings in dealing with contumacious employers. Yet another part of
the problem is the agency itself and the NLRB's own reticence and
reluctance to act.
The other side of the delay problem relates to the NLRB itself
and its politicized nature. When enacting the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 with its broad ambiguous language and five-year appointments, Congress intended for politics and the law to come
together. That is to say, notwithstanding the country's commitment to
both freedom of association and the collective bargaining process, the
lack of a clear consensus about unions has allowed each new White
House occupant to influence (and thus indirectly politicize) the
NLRB through short-term appointments. In contrast to judges who
have life tenure appointments, the relatively abbreviated tenure given
to Board members and to the General Counsel, along with ambiguous
statutory language (i.e., "interfere, restrain, coerce" as unfair labor
practices) that is susceptible to a wide variety of interpretations, highlight the fact that each new President can change the NLRB's direction by appointing new members who are sympathetic to his own
philosophy.
This manifested for the first time when the Eisenhower Board
began to reverse decisions of the appointees of Presidents Roosevelt
and Truman.' 40 Soon thereafter the Kennedy Board did the same
with those appointed by the GOP. 14 1 Despite some mild back and
forth between Nixon, Ford, and Carter, the Reagan-Bush era of the
140. See Mozart G. Ratner, Policy-Making by the New Quasi-JudicialNLRB, 23 U. CMI. L.
REv. 12, 16-17 (1955); W. Willard Wirtz, New NationalLabor Relations Board: Herein of Employer Persuasion,49 Nw. U. L. REv. 594, 594-95 (1954); see also Clyde W. Summers, Politics,
Policy Making, and the NLRB, 5 SYRACUSE L. REv. 93, 97 (1953) ("Seldom in the history of
the Board has so much law been made so quickly by so few.").
141. See Bernard Meltzer, OrganizationalPicketing and the NLRB: Five on a Seesaw, 30 U.
CHI. L. REv. 78, 78 (1962).
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1980s was the first to provide for a relative avalanche of reversals of
well-settled authority.1 42 The Clinton Board I served on provided
rather incremental changes, and the Bush II Board was the most severe of all in its handling of the cases through both reversals and ex43
traordinarily one-sided interpretations of the statute.1
Beginning in the 1980s, the normal to and fro that had been expected and in large measure accepted in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s
began to change. This seems to be attributable to two factors. One is
the rather severe anti-unionism promoted by the Reagan Board in the
1980s. As my Stanford colleague Terry Moe said:
Reagan imposed on the NLRB a brand of radical anti-unionism
that business leaders did not demand and, in fact, had long resisted ... but, especially in an environment of economic adversity
and union decline, some business leaders begun to realize over
time that the reality of an anti-union NLRB was not to be feared at
all-that it proved quite consistent with their own, more confrontational approaches to unions. They were, in effect, dragged kicking
and screaming into the brave new world of political anti-unionism
imby presidential leadership and some saw that what was clearly
44
possible in earlier decades, was now quite possible indeed.1

A second issue is the appointment process and the kind of people
who were generally recruited to serve on the NLRB. It has pervaded
not only the NLRB, where increased polarization between labor and
management enhanced divisiveness, but also administrative agencies
generally. But the NLRB drew more attention than other agencies, in
part because of union involvement in the political process 145 and the
great divide between Democrats and Republicans on these policy
matters.
Said G. Calvin Mackenzie:
142. Examining the Activities and Progress of the NLRB, Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Labor
and Human Resources, 104th Cong. 50-52 (1996) [hereinafter Hearings on Progress of the

NLRB]; see also GOULD,

AGENDA FOR REFORM,

supra note 9, at 19-26; cf William B. Gould IV,

The Burger Court and Labor Law: The Beat Goes On-Marcato,24 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 51, 52
(1987).
143. Hearings on Progress of the NLRB, supra note 142, at 52-53; see also Confirmation of
Professor William B. Gould I , Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Labor and Human Resources,
103rd Cong. 23-24 (testimony of William B. Gould IV, Stanford University) ("I believe that
there is a presumption in favor of stability. As you know, there have been shifts in doctrines
by previous boards, both boards appointed by Democratic as well as by Republican Presidents. I believe in a presumption in favor of stability, and should the Board reverse what it
has done previously, it should have substantial reasons for doing so.").
144. Terry M. Moe, Interests, Institutions, and Positive Theory: The Politics of the NLRB, in
STUDIES IN AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

236, 273 (1987).

145. The Republicans were particularly concerned with Beck v. Communications Workers,
487 U.S. 735 (1988), which allowed dissident workers to object to the expenditure of their
dues for political purposes. Id. at 745-46.
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What is most distressing ultimately is the transcendent loss of purpose in the appointment process. The American model did not
always work perfectly, but it was informed by a grand notion. The
business of the people would be managed by leaders drawn from
the people. Cincinnatus, in-and-outers, non-career managerswith every election would come a new sweep of the country for
high energy and new ideas and fresh visions. The president's team
would assume its place and impose the people's wishes on the
great agencies of government. Not infrequently, it actually worked
that way.
But these days, the model fails on nearly all counts. Most appointees do not come from the countryside, brimming with new energy
and ideas. Much more often they come from congressional staffs or
think tanks or interest groups-not from across the country but
from across the 14street:
interchangeable public elites, engaged in an
6
insider's game.
This process, which began to gain some steam in the '80s, with
the appointment of those who came frequently "across the street"
from Capitol Hill, produced more overtly political "inside Washington" appointments. This, in turn, ultimately led to the process of
"batching," which is the refusal to confirm one nominee until a nominee for another position had been filled, so as to assure a balance of
seats between those who would support labor and management. Until
1994, when I was confirmed as Chairman and two other Board Members and a General Counsel were simultaneously appointed at Senator
Nancy Kassebaum's insistence-the Republican Board Member was a
nominee acceptable to her on policy issues which might come before
the NLRB, there had been no batching in fifty-one years after members Democrat Abe Murdock and Republican J. Copeland Gray took
their oaths in 1947.
But in 1947, the batching occurred because the NLRB, at that
time, was expanded from three to five seats by virtue of the Taft-Hartley amendments to the Act. In 1994 and again in 1997, right on
through the Bush II Board of the twenty-first century, batching became commonplace in the appointment process.1 47 Said Professor
Mackenzie, describing the change in the process:
The tendency to select appointees to an agency as teams and to
divide up control over the choices has become the norm in Washington. The Senate, in fact, often delays confirmation until several
146.

G.

CALVIN MACKENZIE, STARTING OVER: THE PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENT PROCESS IN

1997, at 39-40 (1998); see also PAUL

LIGHT,

A GOVERNMENT

THE FEDERAL SERVICE AND HOW TO REVERSE IT

(2008);

ILL EXECUTED: THE DECLINE OF

PAUL LIGHT, THICKENING GOVERN-

MENT: FEDERAL HIERARCHY AND THE DIFFUSION OF ACCOUNTABILITY
LIGHT, THICKENING GOVERNMENT].

147.

LIGHT, THICKENING GOVERNMENT,

supra note 146, at 30-31.

(1995)

[hereinafter
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nominations to the same agency accumulate, thus allowing it to
require that the President include some nominees who are effectively designated by powerful Senators. "This kind of batching of
nominations rarely happened before the present date. Even on the
regulatory commissions, whose original statutes require that an
only a bare majority of appointees can be from any one party, a
vacancy in an opposition party chair was usually filled by the President with an enrollee in the opposition party who supported the
President. These appointments, common for most of this century,
came to be known as "friendly Indians" and were routinely confirmed by the Senate even when it was controlled by the opposition
party. But they allowed the incumbent President to control the appointment process and to shape the majorities on most regulatory
commissions.
That is nearly impossible these days. The membership of the regulatory commissions has become little more than the sum of the set
of disjointed political calculations. Concerns about fealty to leadership, effective teamwork, and intellectual fealty to leadership and
intellectual or ideological coherence play almost no part in the selection of regulatory commissioners. The juggling of political interests dominates. That we as a nation often get inconsistent and
incoherent regulatory policies should be no surprise to those that
follow the shuffling and dealing that produces regulatory
commissioners.
An additional complicating factor in "batching" is that the Republicans do not have the same incentive to make a deal regarding a
group of nominees for a particular agency. This is especially so of
an agency like the National Labor Relations Board which operates
under statutory principles in which a large number of Republicans
all of the incentives are weighted
do not believe. Accordingly ...
48
toward crippling the agency.1
These phenomena had an unfortunate and untoward effect upon
case processing and thus delay. For the first few years of the Clinton
Board's work, a number of steps were designed to expedite the administrative process, diminish the delay problem, and facilitate more effective law enforcement. 49 And more substantial use of section 10(j)
played a role in this arena. Section 10(j) allows the NLRB, in its discretion, to obtain injunctive relief against a wide variety of unfair labor
148. Id.
149. The Clinton Board attempted to address remedies in a number of ways. It provided unions with access to private property to which they were not normally entitled. See
Fieldcrest Cannon, Inc., 318 N.L.R.B. 470, 473 (1995), enforced in part, 97 F.3d 65 (4th Cir.
1996). The NLRB also obliged employers to pay both Board and union attorney fees and
double costs, as well as nationwide orders and postings at all of an employer's facilities
throughout the United States. Unbelievable, Inc. v. NLRB, 118 F.3d 795, 798 (1997). See
also generally Beverly Cal. Corp., 326 N.L.R.B. 153, 552 (1998), enforced in part, vacated in part
and remanded, 227 F.3d 817 (7th Cir. 2000) (addressing the appropriateness of a broad
nationwide cease-and-desist order and nationwide posting of the order at all of a respondent employer's facilities).
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practices committed by both employers and labor organizations. But
the mandate given to the NLRB to seek injunctions in union unfair
labor practice cases-at the regional level and without consultation
with Washington-makes section 10(j) disproportionately applicable
to employers, 150 even though it involves some unions from time to
time. This is because, while section 10(1) is focused exclusively on unions, section 10(j) is the only provision aimed at employer unfair labor practices and most injunctions and injunction requests are aimed
at employers. This provision is particularly valuable when the NLRB
attempts to address violations in the form of dismissals, discipline, and
refusals to bargain where the passage of time will erode an effective
remedy.
Equally important to any description of the statutory scheme is
that section 10(l)'s trigger is at the regional level; it is the Regional
Attorney who goes into federal district court to obtain an injunction if
there is "reasonable cause to believe" that a violation has occurred
making it far more expeditious. Section 10(j) must be brought to the
full Board. This is a complicated and time-consuming process which
involves a debate in Washington rather than swift action based upon
precedent and Board policy direction in San Francisco, Detroit, or
New York.
In the early 1990s, section 10() fell into disuse. In 1992, under
the Bush I Board, the number of section 10() authorizations had declined to twenty-six, the lowest since the Ford Administration in 1976.
In 1994, this trend was reversed when the Clinton Board authorized section 10(0) injunctions in eighty-three cases. In 1995, section
10(j) injunctions were utilized in 104 cases. This constituted the highwater mark and the most frequent use of section 10(j) in the seventyfour-year history of the Act and the NLRB. Given the substantial delays involved in the numerous administrative layers of the American
process, as well as ultimate resort to the circuit courts of appeal, section 10(j) provides the NLRB with the ability to jump over the hurdles
and issue an injunction, making this provision of the statute peculiarly
vital. One of the most publicized and successful uses of section 10()
took place in connection with the 1994-95 baseball strike, which
brought the strike to conclusion and resulted in the negotiation of the

150. I discussed the contrasting approaches in the mandated area from those that involve an exercise of discretionary authority in TeamstersLocalNo. 372, 323 N.L.R.B. 278, 280
(1997) (Gould, Chairman, concurring).
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1996 collective bargaining agreement. 15 ' It provided an object lesson
to the nation about how labor law could work under proper
circumstances.
Because congressional pressure diminished the number of NLRB
General Counsel requests to authorize injunctions and perhaps encouraged more law-abiding conduct from employers who feared
NLRB litigation authorized by the NLRB, the numbers of injunction
authorizations declined somewhat after 1995. In 1996, only fifty-three
authorizations were provided 52 and General Counsel requests to authorize declined to fifty-nine.' 53 In 1997 and 1998, the number was
fifty-three and forty-five respectively, while the number remained fairly
constant after my departure from the NLRB in late 1998.
But in 2002, the first full year of the Bush II Board, the number
was fourteen, and it was seventeen and fourteen in 2003 and 2004
respectively. The Bush II Board has made the Bush I era look like one
of aggressive law enforcement.
Meanwhile, the number of cases coming before the NLRB has
declined from 40,861, when the Clinton Board first came to the office
in 1994, to 33,715 at the beginning of the Bush II administration. The
numbers sharply declined ever since. This phenomenon may be due
to union lethargy, an unwillingness and inability to recruit new members, 154 the inherent difficulties in organizing under the statute, and a
disillusionment with and boycott of the Bush II Board, reminiscent of
55
9 0
the union reaction to the Reagan Board in the 1 8 s.
But while the number of cases is declining, paradoxically, the
backlog has been increasing. In 1995, the Clinton Board achieved the
lowest backlog ever recorded in the more than three decades of
NLRB record keeping: 330! Nine hundred and thirty-five decisions
were issued. Because of administrative lethargy, turnover at the NLRB,
151. See, e.g., Silverman v. Major League Baseball Player Relations Comm., Inc., 880 F.
Supp. 246, 253-54 (S.D.N.Y 1995) (granting an injunction pursuant to section 10(j) and
effectively ending the 1994-95 Major League Baseball strike), aff'd, 67 F.3d 1054 (2d Cir.
1995).
152. See NLRB Fiscal Year Summary, Memorandum from David Parker, Deputy Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board (2008) (on file with author).
153. Historical Fiscal Year Summary, Memorandum from the NLRB Division of Information (2008) (on file with author).
154. See, e.g., Matt Bai, The New Boss, N.Y. TIMES,Jan. 30, 2005, § 6 (Magazine), at 38; cf
David Moberg, Labor Debates its Future, NATION, Mar. 14, 2005, at 1]; Aaron Bernstein, Big
Labor's Day of Reckoning, BUSINESS WEEK, Mar. 7, 2005, at 65-66.
155. GOULD, AGENDA FOR REFORM, supra note 9, at 158-62. I opposed the union boycott
of the Reagan Board and arguments for deregulation. See William B. Gould IV, Mistaken
Opposition to the NLRB, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 1985, at A27.
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and reluctance of NLRB members to make decisions due to fear of
political consequences, 156 that number more than doubled when I left
office in 1998.157 Even in 1998, the number of cases produced was
709. Now, with a declining caseload, the backlog has stayed steady at
nearly 600 cases, and the number of decisions produced has been between 543 in 2003, 508 in 2005, and 391 in 2007. Though my Board
held elections in more than 3000 cases in 1994, that number declined
to 2302 cases in 2004.
Thus, the Bush II Board has been doing considerably less in
terms of case production, even with a substantially smaller number of
cases, than the Clinton Board in the mid-1990's. And, as noted, the
use of section 10(j) has declined appreciably, even below the level of
the Bush I Board, which itself had set new records for inactivity. As the
strain on Board resources has eased, the agency's energy level has dissipated. The major victims in this process are both unions and employees who use the statute disproportionately (compared to
employers) for the purpose of obtaining protection in the employment relationship, recognition, and bargaining.

Figure 1. Intake and Delay at the NLRB
Clinton Board
1994
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Source: NLRB Annual Reports and data provided by David Parker, Associate Executive Secretary of the

NLRB

156.

The political problems have been chronicled in GOULD, LABORED RELATIONS,

supra note 15, at 287-305.
157. See William B. Gould IV, The Labor Board'sEver-Deepening Somnolence: Some Reflections
ofa Former Chairman,32 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1505, 1519-20 (1999). I previously wrote about
this phenomenon in William B. Gould IV, Independent Adjudication, PoliticalProcess, and the
State of Labor-Management Relations: The Role of the NationalLabor Relations Board, 82 IND. L.J.
461, 479 (2007). See also William B. Gould IV, The NLRB at Age 70: Some Reflections on the
Clinton Board and the Bush II Aftermath, 26 BERKELEYJ. EMPL. & LAB. L. 309, 317-18 (2005).
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Figure 2. Intake and Delay at the Washington Headquarters of
the NLRB
Bush II Board
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Source: NLRB Annual Reports and data provided by David Parker, Associate Executive Secretary
of the NLRB

VIII. What Can Be Done
There are five answers to this delay problem. The first is to
change the method of appointment of NLRB Board Members. The
fundamental problem for the NLRB in the 1990s was that Board
Members were frequently reluctant to act, presumably because they
sought reappointment and were concerned about antagonizing a Republican Congress which itself was antagonistic to the principles of
the NLRA. I began to speak publicly about the delay problem in the
summer of 1998 prior to the expiration of my term as Chairman. But
only when members of Congress inquired with me directly about
cases, 158 sought the identity of the recalcitrant Board Member, and
received my permission to telephone her directly, was action produced. This problem has grown in the early part of the twenty-first
century in the Bush II Board as the caseload declined and productivity
declined along with it. Some of the same political considerations have
been at play again a decade after my service.
If a different method of appointment was written into law, different results might follow. In my view, a key answer to this problem is to
bar reappointment to the NLRB and thus reduce the incentive to maneuver in anticipation of adverse congressional reactions. If reappointment is denied, the appointee knows that there is nothing that
he or she can do to extend their Washington service at the NLRB. If
the term of appointment is extended to eight years, then the public
gets greater benefit of experience and does not, as so often has been
the case in the 1980s and 1990s and this century in particular, have to
reinvent the wheel for new Board Members or for those who are carried forward in limbo out of office for relatively abbreviated periods
under so-called recess appointments. And if the term is substantial,
the Board Member knows that his continued service does not depend
158.

GOULD, LABORED RELATIONS, supra note 15, at 280-83.
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upon pleasing either the Executive Branch or Congress-a problem
that is particularly important given the fact that reappointment is
predicated upon the advice and consent of a Senate which has been
hostile or unduly interested in the results of particular cases.
This will go some way to the achievement of a much needed depoliticization of the NLRB. This could partially break the pattern of
appointment of Washington insiders described by Professor Mackenzie and bring to Washington a geographically diverse group of the
best people who are willing to serve for the very best reasons. The
NLRB needs those like Cincinnatus, who will depart at the end of the
day rather than cling to the trappings of office in Washington.
There is an additional avenue towards depoliticizing the NLRB.
Rulemaking, of the kind that my Board proposed in the mid-1990s, is
necessary. My Board, following the lead of an earlier Supreme Court
decision approving rulemaking, 159 sought unsuccessfully to fashion
rules for disputes about single location of the multiple location facilities where, in that situation, the presumption in favor of single location had been clear since my service as a young attorney with the
NLRB in the early 1960s. At that time, there was continuous litigation
about how far the facilities had to be from one another and how many
employees were being transferred between one facility and another.
These considerations, along with common supervision, were the key
ingredients for unit determination. 160 The model of adjudication produced an incentive for wasteful litigation.
Rulemaking, on the other hand, would provide more stability in
the sense that reversal of previous decisions would be more difficult by
virtue of rulemaking's requirement for public input over a substantial
period of time rather than adjudication which would facilitate easy
reversals, sometimes without amicus briefs, oral argument, or the
knowledge of many interested parties. If rulemaking is facilitated, the
potential for a seesaw-like reversal of prior Board authority with each
new President will be diminished. In this way, the public interest in
principled decision making, free from immediate political passion, is
more easily realized. The worst thing that can happen in 2009 is sim-

159. See generally Am. Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606 (1991) (holding that the
NLRB's rule that eight defined employee units are appropriate for collective bargaining in
any acute care hospital is valid).
160. See generally Examiningthe Issues Surroundingthe NLRB's Rulemaking ConcerningSingle
Location BargainingUnits in Representation Cases, Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Small Business, 104th Cong. 104-65 (1996).
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ply a substitute of the dissents rendered during Bush II along strictly
party lines, as important as many of the reversals of that era.
But the fact is that time limits in which the NLRB should act will
still be important as well. The Supreme Court has noted that "delay in
the administrative process is . ..deplorable . . . [i] t is even more
deplorable if... innocent employees had to live for some years on
reduced incomes as a combined result of the delay and the company's
illegal [misconduct] .. .
Again, this is why time limits for the handling of representation
petitions should be something in the order of ten days, as in some of
the Canadian provinces. During my Chairmanship, time limits were
established for administrative law judges for the handling of unfair
labor practice charges and regional directors for the processing of
representation cases. 162 But I could not convince the NLRB to adopt
time limits for themselves, even in the form of guidelines. Congress
must do so through labor law reform because even the best members
may be reticent in establishing time limits for themselves, as was the
case in the 1990s.
As Judge Noonan said for the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit:
No decisionmaking body is totally immune from the dilatory virus,
and delay is sometimes the too human way of grappling with
thorny issue of policy. Nonetheless, the Board stands out as a federal administrative agency which has been rebuked before for what
must strike anyone as a cavalier disdain for the hardship it is causing .... We call [the doctrine that extraordinary delay is grounds
for refusing to enforce an administrative order] to the Board's attention as a reminder that, whatever its internal problems, the
Board has a63duty to act promptly in the discharge of its important
functions.1
What are the best ways in which time limits should be implemented and what, if any, sanctions or procedures should be put in
place for such a situation in light of past Board behavior? In one instance, the Court of Appeals required the NLRB to issue a decision
161. NLRB v.J.H. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co. Inc., 396 U.S. 258, 265-66 (1969). In NLRB v.
Pool Manufacturing Co., 339 U.S. 577, 582 (1950), the Court intimated that, under some
circumstances, delay "through its length alone may mature into a denial of an enforcement
decree or make necessary the adduction of additional evidence." Id. at 582; cf NLRB v.
Eanet, 179 F.2d 15, 21-22 (D.C. Cir 1949) (supporting the view that the court should
require some recent indication that a decree is warranted).
162.

See

163.

NLRB v. Ancor Concepts, 166 F.3d 55, 59 (2d Cir. 1999).

GOULD, LABORED RELATIONS,

supra note 15, at 78-84.
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within a specific period of time-and the decision was issued. 164 For
nearly four decades the courts have made it clear that they have the
authority to compel agency action. 165 But, this cannot be done in
every instance.
What then is the best way to implement time limits? One possibility would be to deny the agency appropriations and to sanction or
penalize it where it fails. But this would be counterproductive because
the denial of resources would make it all the more difficult for the
NLRB to meet its obligations. Some other avenue must be found.
Another approach is through publicity relating to the productivity of all Board Members.1 66 Offenders, exposed to the cruel light of
day, might behave differently. Belatedly, shortly before my term of office expired in 1998, I found that Board Members moved to produce
cases when I identified them in response to congressional inquiries.
The non-producers may respond differently when revealed to the
public and to Congress. Some kind of institutional record keeping
that does not identify cases by name seems appropriate. Equally appropriate, it seems to me, is statutory discretion for the Chairman to
do what I did without statutory authorization, which is to reveal names
and cases to those who inquired. This will obviously take its toll on
collegiality, and the action that I took as Chairman sacrificed this
consideration.
This means that other routes should be considered and taken as
well. I attempted to devise a rule which allowed for the issuance of
opinions, without those who went beyond a given deadline, when the
individual Board Member wished to issue a concurring or dissenting
164. In one case, a writ of mandamus was successfully sought and obtained from the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia requiring the NLRB to issue a decision that
was pending with the court for seventeen years, within only a twelve-day time period. See In
re Pirlott, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 1352 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 18, 2007). The NLRB obeyed.
Scheiber Foods, 349 N.L.R.B. No. 14 (2007).
165. Neil Templeton v. Dixie Color Printing Co., Inc., 313 F. Supp. 105, 109-10 (N.D.
Ala. 1970). See also generallyJacob E. Gersen & Anne Joseph O'Connell, Deadlines in Administrative Law, 156 U. PA. L. RFv. 923 (2008) (providing a historical overview of the use of
deadlines to control agencies); Note, Judicial Acceleration of the Administrative Process: The
Right to Relief from Unduly Protracted Proceedings, 72 YALE L.J. 574 (1963) (arguing that
delayed administrative proceedings warrant judicial intervention).
166. A variation on this theme is set forth in the so-called "September Rule" of the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals, which makes it such "that a judge with two unwritten opinions
more than six months old cannot assume any new cases after summer recess." Patricia M.
Wald, Doctor, Lawyer, Merchant, Thief 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1127, 1138 (1992). Also, the
D.C. Circuit is in the practice of granting relief of some kind-in the form of mandatesbefore releasing some opinions. Teva Pharm., USA, Inc. v. Leavitt, 548 F.3d 103, 105 (D.C.
Cir. 2008).
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opinion or examine the opinion further with a view towards raising
points that he or she felt had not been sufficiently discussed or considered. A variation on this theme would permit an opinion to be issued
promptly in a per curiam fashion, as the United States Supreme Court
has done in the context of national emergency disputes under TaftHartley when an injunction did not allow for a complete opinion because of the harm done by the strike. 16 7 The Chairman could have the
statutory authority to issue the decision with the understanding that
an opinion or more complete opinion would come later.
A fourth answer is to reform the electoral process and to repose
finality in the hands of the Regional Director with regard to both unit
and eligibility pre-hearing issues, as well as post-election issues relating
to the parties' conduct during and before the ballot itself. As the Employee Free Choice Act provides, the Regional Director should have
authority, to seek injunctive relief against offending employers under
section 10(j) in connection with union organizational activity. As
noted above, the fact that the authority to seek an injunction lies in
the hands of the NLRB under section 10(j) and the region under section 10(1) makes the former statutory scheme inferior to the latter
because of the time it takes to get to Washington and to obtain approval. And, because institutional resources and appropriations would
inevitably limit the amount of section 10(j) activity that could be undertaken, similar reform in connection with finality of representation
decision making is even more important. The parties have the authority to obtain an expeditious resolution of representation matters, providing the Regional Director with final authority to decide these
cases. 68 But the parties do not use it. A new statute should mandate
that the Regional Director, who is as expert as the Board Members
(and probably more so, given the fact that the former are career civil
servants who have more familiarity with the law and practice) be the
final arbiter, absent extraordinary circumstances where new issues
arise.
A fifth approach to this problem lies in adaptation of some of the
procedures that have arisen in private arrangements, which have
served as a surrogate or alternative to the Act and Board itself. Privately negotiated labor-management card check agreements have re167.

See generally United States v. United Steelworkers, 361 U.S. 39 (1959) (holding that

evidence of the strike's effect on specific defense projects supported a judgment that the
strike endangered the nation's safety).
168. New "Full" Consent Election Agreement Procedure, Memorandum from the Office of the Gen, Counsel, Div. of Operations-Mgmt. (March 21, 2005).
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ceived the most attention in this area, 169 though no one knows the
extent to which they have been adopted and facilitated.
Notwithstanding their popularity, the privately negotiated card
checks contain serious limitations, many of them identified in an important article by Professor Laura Cooper. 170 She notes that more discretion is given to an NLRB hearing officer to seek out the facts on his
or her own with regard to such issues as unit, eligibility to vote, and, in
connection with card check itself, whether the cards are "current."
Notes Cooper:
[T]he arbitrator [who resolves card check issues] presides over a
process that is adversarial, in which responsibility for gathering and
presenting evidence vests in the union and the employer. In contrast, the NLRB, as a federal administrative agency, has confidential investigatory powers that can be used to gather information in
a manner that can better protect vulnerable employees from retaliation and the fear of retaliation. The ability of the NLRB, as a neutral government agency, to gather information from employees in
a more protected setting is also likely to lead to more accurate testimony less influenced by 1fears
of retaliation or the excesses of an
71
adversarial presentation.
Professor Cooper also notes that the NLRB frequently gives uncooperative witnesses a promise of confidentiality, has the authority to
issue subpoenas, documents interviewees' statements with sworn affidavits, and, acting as a neutral, can be more aggressive than an arbitrator who is "dependent upon the parties to investigate and present the
evidence.' 72 She notes that the lack of discovery in arbitration involving recognition issues, as opposed to the NLRA, puts a burden upon
the arbitrator to devise discovery orders in mid-stream in the hearing
73
itself. 1
Of course, most card check procedures presuppose some form of
a hearing, thus imposing the above noted institutional strains upon
the process. But, in looking to what has emerged in the private sector,
which might be used as part of labor law reform, and the fact that lack
of speed is the major problem, one should keep in mind that "[t] he
path to systemic reform ...
probably lies not only in easing agency
workloads and increasing their resources, but also in recognizing that
169. See, e.g., James Brudney, Neutrality Agreements and Card Check Recognition: Prospects
for Changing Paradigms,90 IowA L. REv. 819, 823-31 (2005).
170. LauraJ. Cooper, PrivatizingLabor Law: Neutrality/CardCheck Agreements and the Role
of the Arbitrator,83 INDIAONA L.J. 1589, 1602-03 (2008).
171. Id. at 1609.
172. Id. at 1611.
173. Id. at 1613.
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trial-type procedures are not necessarily the best or only fair means of
74
reaching administrative decisions."'
First Group, a major British multinational with 100,000 employees in the United States, has attempted to fashion a process which
leaves secret ballot box elections in the hands of the National Labor
Relations Board and thus avoids some of the problems identified by
Professor Cooper, but at the same time, establishes an independent
monitor mechanism to resolve freedom of association complaints arising out of union organizational efforts.' 75 The Freedom of Association
("FOA") policies were derived from the company's social responsibility policy and explicitly state that its protection for employees is not
only rooted in international law, but also is stronger than those in the
National Labor Relations Act-though employees and union organizers may always file a charge with the NLRB at any point. The
process does not provide for a hearing but rather an investigation conducted by the independent monitor staff with public recommendations to the company and complaining party within thirty to sixty days
subsequent to the filing of the complaint. The company has an additional thirty days to respond to the recommendations and, in a sub1 76
stantial majority of the cases, has accepted the recommendations.
The advantages to this process are obvious. The first is the remarkable speed within which complaints are processed and, while the
independent monitor does not possess affidavits or the authority to
issue subpoenas, the company and the relevant unions have thus far
complied with the inquiries of a neutral party who, in contrast to an
arbitrator in card check cases, has an investigative staff. Thus, the discovery problem alluded to above is overridden. Additionally, in contrast to the National Labor Relations Act-which is the only modern
employment statute that is not posted in company facilities, extensive
publicity about freedom of association rights and procedures is provided through enclosed bulletins boards with complaint forms and related FOA information, as well as a DVD for the company's 100,000
employees.
174. George A. Bermann, Administrative Delay and its Control, 30 Am. J. CoMP. L. Supp.
473, 474 (1982).
175. I was appointed Independent Monitor in this program in November 2007 and I
assumed the responsibility for it on January 1, 2008.
176. William B. Gould IV, Professor, Stanford Law School, The Decline and Irrelevance of the NLRB and What Can be Done About It: Some Reflections on Privately Devised
Alternatives, Speech Before the State Bar of California Labor and Employment Law Section (Oct. 31, 2008); William B. Gould IV, Former NLRB Chairman Urges Reform of Board,
NLRA in New Administration, 212 DAILY LAB. REP. A-8 (BNA), Nov. 3, 2008.
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Why can't the first step in statutory amendments provide at least
an opportunity for the parties to opt into such a process, in much the
same way in which they cooperated with the settlement judge process
created during my Chairmanship at the Labor Board and conducted
by administrative law judges? 177 Why can't the parties be given the
option of proceeding toward immediate investigation of the kind provided by First Group's FOA policy, which is presided over by an Administrative Law Judge or respected private citizen acceptable to both
the union and the company, with the investigation, proceeding for an
abbreviated period of time? If both sides accept the third party recommendations, the matter is at an end in just a couple of months, as
opposed to the years involved in the NLRB and the courts. Perhaps
the recommendations could be taken into account in subsequent proceedings, if one side accepts and the other does not. But if the process
is unsuccessful and neither side accepts, all bets are off regarding subsequent litigation; the normal process, with a charge filed process,
proceeds with the abovementioned amendments promoting expeditious resolution.
First Group's policy and many of the card check arrangements,
however, contain one feature which may be difficult to replicate in
legislation, i.e., the requirement that the employer not engage in antiunion speech (coercive or non-coercive), utilize captive audience
speeches at which employees are compelled to listen to the employer's message against unions on company time and property,17 8 or
distribute literature of the same antiunion tenor.1 79 It is this feature
that has proved to be so attractive to the unions and led to a high rate
of organization and a more than ninety percent success rate with
NLRB conducted elections.
As the Supreme Court has recently noted, 8 0° however, the employer right to engage in non-coercive speech is one rooted not only
in the NLRA, but more than arguably, in the First Amendment of the
Constitution itself.18 1 Said the Court in Chamber of Commerce
The NLRB took the position that §8 demanded employer neutrality during organizing campaigns, reasoning that any partisan em177. See generally NLRB v. Beverly Enterprises-Mass. Inc., 174 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 1999)
(explaining with approval the process by which an administrative law judge reviews a
dispute).
178. See sources cited supra note 47.
179. Beverly Enterprises-Haw., Inc., 326 N.L.R.B. 335, 361-68 (1998) (Gould, Chairman, dissenting).
180. See Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Brown, 128 S. Ct. 2408, 2413 (2008).
181. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537-38 (1945).

UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

ployer speech about unions would interfere with the §7 rights of
employees.... In 1941, this Court curtailed the NLRB's aggressive
interpretation, clarifying that nothing in the NLRA prohibited an
employer from "expressing his view on labor policies or problems"
unless the employer's speech "in connection with other circumstances [amongst] the coercion within the meaning of the Act"
NLRB v Virginia Elec. & Power Co.... We subsequently characterized Virginia Electric as recognizing the First Amendment right of
employers to engage in non-coercive speech about unionization.
[citing Thomas v. Collins] 182
Also, the Court in Chamber of Commerce cited approvingly its comment that the free speech provision of the Act "merely implements
1 83
the First Amendment."
Though constitutional problems are presented by regulation of
employer speech (in contrast to voluntary waivers), there is no constitutional issue raised by the statutory provision for more union speech.
Thus, Supreme Court authority which has severely restricted non-employee union organizer access to company property, 18 4 as well as circuit court and Board precedents disallowing non-employee union
organizers the right to reply to captive audience speeches, can be reversed by the Congress as part of labor law reform. It should be done
so as to promote the marketplace of ideas in the workplace by both
sides, not simply the employer on its own.
Conclusion
For more than four decades, Congress has confronted, struggled
with, debated, and sometimes passed legislation (as in 1977 and 2007)
providing for labor law reform. The most recent version of it, the Employee Free Choice Act, which will be at the forefront of the Obama
Administration policy debate, contains new and important initiatives,
particularly in the areas of recognition and arbitration. The Act is a
step forward inasmuch as it is predicated upon an analysis of the status
quo, which is fundamentally sound. But it needs to be amended and
expanded with much of its focus altered. It is important not to substitute one imperfect system for another.
The case for action is strong. Now that the opportunity exists for
labor law reform, as it has not since the Carter administration, it is
182.
183.
184.

Brown, 128 S. Ct. at 2413.
Here, the Court referenced NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617 (1969).
Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 532 (1992).
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important to get it right this time around. 8 5 As President Obama has
said in a different context, it is important to speak here with "deliber186
ate haste."

185. "In the Clinton era, financial issues routinely trumped labor concerns. If Mr.
Obama's campaign promises are to be kept, that mindset cannot prevail again." The Labor
Agenda, supra note 5.
186. See Transcript: "I'm Going to Confront This Economic Crisis," Obama Says, CNN.com,
Nov. 7, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/11/O7/obama.conference.transcript/.
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